Undercover Armies - CIA FOIA - Central Intelligence Agency

C05303949
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RED LIGHTAT THE END OF THE TUNNEO
The COS concluded that many in the Lao leadership were in a "very dicey
frame of mind. If the intermingled currents of frustration and fear [were to]
intersect," leading them to despair of any gain from the present course, they
might well "precipitately adopt the first ... step toward an exit from the war
by calling for a cessation of bombing throughout the country." 18D
Operation STRENGTHO
Washington, still preoccupied with Yang Pao's tactics, ignored Tovar's anxiety
about keeping the Lao in the war. Instead, an interagency message sent
cautionary instructions, calling for a "thinning out" of the Long Tieng defenders.
Tovar protested this as "disastrous" and told Headquarters to ensure that
the DCI was apprised of his "personal convictions on this matter." Meanwhile,
the diversionary operation, called Operation STRENGTH, was already under
way. A week earlier, on 3 February, Air America had begun ferrying irregulars
to Pa Dong, east of Long Tieng, whence they headed north on foot, carrying
rations for a week and maintaining radio silence. 19 0
With Hmong elements already at the edge of the Plain of Jars, the COS and
Mac Godley supplemented Tovar's initial protest with a cable arguing against
"thinning out" the Long Tieng defenses and dispersing them for a defense in
depth. This, they claimed, would only setup the defenders for seriatim plucking
if the enemy were not distracted by a threat to his rear. And with or without
a diversionary operation, they now saw no prospects for a phased
, withdrawal. The COS and Godley maintained that the debacle on the Plain of
Jars had proved the point, and they adopted I
!argument when
they predicted that any reprise of that action would suffer the same fate.2°0
Tovar and Godley acknowledged Washington's anxiety about President
Nixon's imminent visit to Beijing, and the embarrassment of having it accompanied
by a military disaster in Laos. Nevertheless, they insisted, the most
promising alternative lay in the current deployment of 5,000 men to the northeast
while the remaining 7,000 effectives dug in around Long Tieng. D
21
g----
Washington's guidancehas not been found, but its thrust is evident in Vientiane's response.Godley
and Tovar modified their position on a defense-in-depth, saying that, ever since December,
Vang Pao had been10rgriZing militias to protect civilianscon.centrated betweenLong Tieng and
the Vientiane Plain.
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