Undercover Armies - CIA FOIA - Central Intelligence Agency

C05303949
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WITHAN EYE ON PAR/SO
inger knew that Nixon feared giving Hanoi a pretext to delay releasing American
pows. D . '.
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Kissinger argued that the North Vietnamese would stall only if they wanted
a showdown for other reasons, and the USAF carpet-bombed three area targets-"boxes"-around
Paksong on 23 February. Meanwhile, the NVA had
just followed heavy shelling of one of Vang Pao's positions with a ground
assault, and the prime minister approved B-52 bombing there as welI.r--
Checking NVA ComplianceD '
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Iwas already turning its attention to the verification question,
and Savannakhet proposed ~n intelligence operation into the Mu Gia Pass area
that would draw on the roadwatch activity of the 1960s and the logistic techniques
developed for the later Commando Raiders. In mid-March, Kissinger
approved the concept, which assumed that electronic sensors would need supplementation
by human sources. 0
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From the executive director's office, Bill Colby noted another prblem; the
potential for vulnerable roadwatch teams to inhibit air force planning for possible
strikes on NVA concentrations remaining in Laos. There were political
sensitivities as well: in Paris, talks were continuing in an atmosphere of bitter
contention about cease-fire implementation, and, in early June, Headquarters
suspended a team operation until after the impending session. Washington
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Kissinger, Years ofUpheaval. 316-17.1
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