Undercover Armies - CIA FOIA - Central Intelligence Agency

C05303949
Chapter Eight
On 6 August, 1,000 Hmong guerrillas occupied the stretch of road east of
Ban Ban. A smaller force launched a diversionary opt:ration against the secondary
target, between Ban Ban and the Plain of Jars.o gunners accompanying
the Hmong in the latter action used recoilless rifles to silence the
mortars of an enemy company guarding a bridge just north of the target. With
the site secured, the demolitions team laid its charges. The blasts blew away
the cliff face, covering the road with mounds of rock, while other charges
nearby cut deep trenches, each 100 feet long, in the roadbed. By the time the
enemy was able to direct more fire on the site, several hours later, the attackers
had safely withdrawn.J9L] .
To the east, things went even better. The Pathet Lao garrison apparently
fled, but other enemy forces responded almost immediately, approaching from
both directions on Route 7. Like their counterparts to the west, these were
halted with heavy weapons fire, especially that directed byl
Owho justified his reputation as someone who could "drop a 4.2-inch
mortar shell down a chimney." Concern about an overwhelming enemy reaction
dissipated, and the demolitions teams had five days in which to blow
away the roadbed with cratering charges. These dug a trench 1,000 feet long
and 10 feet deep. Meanwhile,j
~unners shelled a Pathet Lao camp, and a
demolitions team destroyed a bridge. Friendly casualties in both operations
totaled one killed and three missing, and the road remained out of commission
until after the end of the rainy season. 40 0 .
I
Iattributed this startling success primarily to expert planning by
Lair and Yang Pao and to the technical competence and combat leadership of
[assigned to the operation. But the Hmong who constituted the
I
bulk of the manpower had, in the space of two-and-a-half years, undergone a
transformation without which the operation could not have been contemplated.
The foresight of I • IBill Lair had resulted in the
creation of Special Guerrilla Units and Special Operations Teams, I
I
ITribal irregulars previously
uncomprehending of any technique or tactic beyond ambush at the approaches
to one's own village could now be deployed, in relatively large units, far from
home. I
Ithey were more combat
effective than either FAR or the Pathet Lao, and the Route 7 operation demonstrated
that with some expert help they could mount a sophisticated, coordinated
offensive operation."D
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