Undercover Armies - CIA FOIA - Central Intelligence Agency

C05303949
Chapter Eleven
Accordingly,Dproceeded to improvise the ground-to-air tactical communications
that Vientiane had included in its proposal of January 1966. The
base gave its teams the civilian HT-I walkie-talkie first introduced by USAID;
with this, a roadwatch outpost could talk to the AC-47 communications platform
orbiting overhead. The information was relayed to a FAC, who would
then guide the strike aircraft to their targets. As soon as new HT-I radios with
compatible frequencies came into the inventory, the teams would report their
observations directly to the .FACplanel
I
I 1"0
Information from roadwatch teams permitted not only tactical strikes, at
least on fixed targets, but a more focused effort by low-level aerial reconnaissance
to map the continuously expanding roads and trails. In mid-February, for
example, an 0-I "Cricket" FAC used ground team reporting to search the j unction
of Routes 23 and 91I. The intelligence turned out to be precisely accurate,
and the reconnaissance was greeted with intense small arms fire that damaged
'the observation plane and shot down one of the heavily armored Al-E escorts.
Other, less time-sensitive roadwatch contributions included information on
truck models-for evaluation of cargo capacities-descriptions of personnel
and equipment, traffic volume, and NVA security techniques. 60 D
The station recognized that 10 teams would not suffice to achieve continuous,
comprehensive coverage of the trail network in the central Panhandle. It
was not merely a matter of numbers of teams-something the station soon
addressed-but the scarcity of suitable landing pads. More teams would not
help if they could not be infiltrated, and this obstacle threatened what Admiral
Sharp had taken to describing as the "most fruitful intelligence collection
resource" on the Panhandle. The admiral did what he could to help. He picked
up on a hint from Bill Lair when he instructed the air force element at Udorn
to work with!
I to evaluate the "helicopter jungle penetrator systems"
already being used in Vietnam to land personnel through the multiple layers of
jungle canopy.61D .
To preserve the collection capacity it already had,l
Irefined the
practices that allowed conventional teams to evade enemy attempts to eradicate
them. Early-morning supply drops were abandoned, wherever communist
patrols might discover a team bivouac site, in favor of night drops. Teams
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