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Undercover Armies - CIA FOIA - Central Intelligence Agency

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C05303949<br />

SEcl- T1IMR<br />

REV. LIGHTAT THE END OF THE TUNNEO<br />

At this point, in the first days of September, another Hmong task force<br />

south of the plain was repulsed after making some promising gains, and its<br />

effectiveness evaporated when two accidental bombings by Laotian T-28s<br />

killed 64 and wounded 43 of its troops. These disasters might have impelled<br />

Yang Pao to write finis to Operation'<br />

Ibut the fast-movers<br />

finally arrived, and additional B-52s as well, and the morale of the irregulars<br />

rose as the NVA gave some ground. By mid-September, one task force was<br />

making good progress along and into the northwestern Plain of Jars, and Task<br />

Force Delta, the one mauled by the NVA north of the plain, had a new commander.<br />

In addition, several hundred of its troops were discovered to have<br />

stayed behind-AWOL or on leave-at the initial deployment and were now<br />

available to help reconstitute its constituent BGs. The ever-reliable GM 30<br />

was back from Savannakhet,I<br />

D2D<br />

These modestly encouraging developments drew' no 'applause from the<br />

newly appointed CINCPAC, Adm. Noel Gayler, when he arrived at Udom on<br />

14 September. He had visited Laos before, and] Iremembered him as<br />

having been impressed by the effort at Long Tieng and visibly moved by the<br />

sight of the wounded at the Sam Thong hospital. Now, he surprised his hosts<br />

when he refused to see Yang Pao, on the ground that such a visitation might<br />

generate fjlSe hOPis of expanded support. It also seemed that he was determined,<br />

in . words, to avoid "losing his objectivity thriU8i intimate<br />

contact with a situation about which he had deep misgivings." 63<br />

Gayler derogated Operation I<br />

las a hopeless failure, and<br />

questioned the authority for launching it in the first place] Iefforts to<br />

explain the various equities-Yang Pao's military and strategic considerations,<br />

the conditions for a peace agreement, and explicit White House<br />

encouragement ofl ~elicited only Gayler's assertion that he<br />

worked for the JCS, and no one else. Ifthe terms of reference were asl I<br />

had stated them, he might well approach "higher authority" to get' them<br />

changed. Concerned Ithat ~aYr might substantially influence "what we do or<br />

do not do out here," described the encounter in grisly detail for the<br />

benefit of Headquarters. 64 "<br />

I<br />

I<br />

Iattended the session and later pointed out that<br />

the JCS had just ordered Gayler to determine "why there was not more bombovar<br />

inter-<br />

SEC~TIIMR<br />

[465

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