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Undercover Armies - CIA FOIA - Central Intelligence Agency

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C05303949<br />

NEW RULESOF ENGAGEMEmD<br />

recoilless rifles to Hmong positions within range of Pathet Lao positions and<br />

to step up munitions deliveries to the Hmong and their neutralist allies. The<br />

Hmong already held one position jointly with Kong Le's men, andI<br />

believed that, absent a North Vietnamese attack in'force, the proposed level of<br />

activity would save Kong Le. All this was done without consulting Souvanna<br />

Phouma, whose resentment of communist perfidy had not yet turned him into<br />

,a reliable partner of the anticommunist forces in Laos. D<br />

71<br />

To bring the prime minister into consistently active opposition to the communists<br />

had been an American goal ever since the conclusion of the Geneva<br />

Agreements. The US Mission now sought to engage him in supporting the<br />

anticommunist forces in the northeast by offering the government a gift of<br />

several C.-46 cargo planes. Souvanna accepted these, for they gave him the<br />

capability directly to support Kong Le's units, the only forces personally loyal<br />

to him. He then began allowing airport authorities to clear other C-46s, merely<br />

leased to the Lao but also carrying Laotian markings, to pick up ordnance at<br />

the border town of Paksane for delivery to Long Tieng. One of these even<br />

picked up ammunitionI<br />

Iand flew it<br />

direct to Kong Le's headquarters on the Plain of Jars, The ploy thus paid for<br />

itself: giving Souvanna control of some of the air transport supplying Kong Le<br />

and the Hmong not only secired his yrsonal involvement but legalized some<br />

of the direct flights between and upcountry sites."D<br />

On 26 April, Governor Harriman saw Chairman Khrushchev and Foreign<br />

Minister Gromyko in Moscow. He got little satisfaction: Gromyko denied the<br />

presence of North Vietnamese troops in Laos, and Khrushchev responded to<br />

pleas for a more active ICC by appealing to the inviolable socialist principle<br />

of noninterference in other nations' affairs. But things quieted down on the<br />

Plain of Jars in the week that followed. To some in the White House, it seemed<br />

that Hmong support had supplemented direct material aid to the neutralists in<br />

damping down the Pathet Lao campaign to expel Kong Le from the Plain of<br />

Jars. D<br />

73<br />

In the relative quiet that prevailed during most of May, Kong Le, Vang Pao,<br />

and a Phoumi representative prepared to retake key positions the communists<br />

had seized from the neutralists on the eastern Plain of Jars and at Xieng<br />

Khouang town. Reporting this to Headquarters, Ambassador Unger pointed<br />

out the risks'; to make a move in force might invite a decisive riposte from<br />

rl--<br />

"I I<br />

1) Memorandum of Conversation. 26 April 1963, FRUS 1961-1963. 1000-05: Memorandum<br />

from Michael V. Forrestal to President Kennedy. "Help to K~ Le and Meos," 1 May 1963,<br />

FRUS 1961-1963,1007--08; Hilsman, To Move a Nation, 152.U<br />

I<br />

sEcI"T1IMR<br />

7~5

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