Undercover Armies - CIA FOIA - Central Intelligence Agency

C05303949
Appendix
The hill tribes of northern Laos, like those in neighboring Thailand and
Burma, had long engaged in growing poppies and producing and selling
opium. In Laos, at least, no statute prohibited this until 1971, when under US
pressure the Laotian government declared the traffic illegal. When case officer
Stuart Methven set out to explore tribal resistance potential in the northwest in
early 1961, he discovered that opium was the tribesmen's "mainstay" commercialcrop.2D.
.
The so-called war on drugs in the United States was still years away,.but
even so, this constituted an obvious impediment to an association with the
tribesmen. Looking for a way around the problem, Methven chanced upon a
Catholic missionary in Luang Prabang. The priest told him of the French practice
of buying Hmong loyalty along with the tribe's opium production, and
Methven suggested to Headquarters that, until "adequate [crop] substitutes"
were introduced, the United States might do the same.D
Headquarters consulted the US Narcotics Bureau, which reacted with an
"unequivocal negative." There was no legal market for the crop, the Bureau
said, and in any case, it would fetch a better price in the illegal trade. Purchase
by ~e Agency would result only in grea~er Tal rOduction, and the station
was Instructed to table Methven's suggestion.' . .
The creation of the Hmong resistance in Military Region 2 had just begun,
at that point, andl Iprohibited allowing the tribesmen to carry opium
onto any US-chartered aircraft. Only large packages were inspected, and it
was understood that small quantities, destined for local consumption, might
well move between upcountry sites. But the prohibition on commercial trafficking
was unequivocal, and Yang Pao's case officers made clear to him that
any Hmong involvement in the opium traffic risked ending the Agency's support
of the resistance.'D
I This appendix summarizes material only from the interviews and file material used in preparing
this history of the irregular warfare program. It does not, therefore, constitute a comprehensive
study of CIA knowledge of, or possible operational or intelligence contact with, parties to the
illicit narcotics traffic in Laosn .'
I
4 Author's recollection.U
SE~LTIIMR
~6