Undercover Armies - CIA FOIA - Central Intelligence Agency

C05303949
Chapter Twenty-two
homeland had pever been more than pathetic fantasy. The end of the Cold War
only confirmed the transformation of American purposes in Indochina that the
defeat of 1975 had set in motion.D
The Laotian LegacyD
No one, Hmong or American, had anticipated the ferocity or the duration of
the struggle that began in early 1961. Its cost to the Hmong in human 1ife and
in economic and social disruption, therefore, was equally unforeseen. The
modest beginnings of the Hmong program reflected its modest aim: to preserve
at least part of northeastern Laos from Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese
domination0
The limited objectives and surreptitious management of the early program,
imposed by the imperative to preserve Laotian neutrality, were abetted by the
structure and style of the instrument chosen to arm, train, and advise the
Hmong irregulars. Bill Lair's self-effacing styleI
encouraged the evolution of indigenous leadership. At the same time, the relatively
easy assimilationI
Iinto the Hmong community kept
their visibility low even while their flexibility and multiple skills ensured a
maximum return on their modest numbers.D
Only the unique circumstances governing the conflict in Laos.permitted
CIA to continue as the field manager of the paramilitary effort there. The
Hmong program was still proving itself in the spring of 1961 when the failure
of the Bay of Pigs invasion inflicted a grievous blow to the Agency's reputation
for competence in covert warfare. But the Kennedy administration
wanted both Laotian neutrality and an effort to keep the "cork in the bottle,"
and the only way to square that circle was to let CIA ron the Hmong program.
The Agency would operate, however, under Department of State direction and
specifically under an ambassador who would enjoy unprecedented authority
over the agencies-State, Defense, USAID, USIS, and CIA-represented on
his country team. Rather than presiding over an array of autonomous agencies,
each with its Washington-based agenda, the ambassador would function more
like a military commander, setting priorities and organizing resources on a
missionwide basis. 26D .
I
25
.i.: r;;.2