Undercover Armies - CIA FOIA - Central Intelligence Agency

C051303949
Chapter Three
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On I March]
Ito man 8lmm mortars in fire
missions against the Plain of Jars.1
had been reluctant to supply
4.2-inch mortars, fearing they were too heavy, but Lair I
linsisted
that the Hmong could move them. With a range of 8,000 yards, a few of them
in the right places could bring the entire plain under fire. Ambassador Brown
and Chief PEO supported the idea, and Headquarters acceded. 0 32
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No one expectedI land the Hmong to do more than harass the enemy
and force him to divert resources otherwise available to thwart Phoumi's campaign
to retake the Plain of Jars. Thus, the burden of dislodging Kong Le and
the communists remained a FAR responsibility. But despite accelerated deliveries
of materiel under the US Military Assistance Program, the Laotian army
continued to distinguish itself primarily by its lassitude and incompetence. On
9 March, having failed with a drive east toward the Plain of Jars, General
Phoumi's forces retreated in the face of a counterattack and lost the critical
junction of Routes 7 and 13."0
Leaning Toward Unilateral Military ActioG
Recovering the Plain of Jars had formed the keystone of the US policy
aimed at negotiations from strength. Relatively populous and agriculturally
productive, it also served as the nexus of the road system in northeastern Laos.
Now, as the headquarters of both Kong Le's neutralists and the regional Pathet
Lao command, it also represented a challenge to government efforts to reclaim
it. The fact remained that, except for Kong Le's own airborne battalion, the
~I I
Also see Memorandum from the President s MIlitary Aide {Chtton} to President Kennedy, 10
March 1961, FRUS 1961-1963, 84-85. The then chief of PEO told a White House military aide
that "every time a battalion commander becomes lao aggressive. Phcumi relieves him of command.
He doesn't wantanyone personality to develop as a [competing] military leader." Ina curiously
self-contradictory estimate of Phoumi's forces, the PEG chief noted that they had "folded"
under random artillery fire at Sala Phou Khoun, even as he assessed theirmorale as good,D
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