Undercover Armies - CIA FOIA - Central Intelligence Agency

1 Ihad
C05303949
FOCUS ON THE PANHANDLED
Working with Laotian officials at the provincial level, the embassy tried to
make Ban Keng Kok, in the Panhandle just east of Savannakhet, the showpiece.
Like most of the others, however, it fell victim to fragmented American
management. Ambassador Unger insisted on running itthrough a subcommittee
of the country team in Vientiane, and the incoherent, ill-coordinated activity
that followed impeded I
. Iin his efforts
to help assure Ban Keng Kok's security. 46 0 . .
Of the six sites under development in December 1963 only one, at Houei
Kong on the southeastern Bolovens, was prospering in mid-1964. Not by
coincidence, it had unitary management, in the person ofl
land a
security-force-in-being. This unit was manned by the 400 Kha of the Nja
Hune tribe who had been salvaged from the US Special Forces program begun
in 1962, and their presence made Houei Kong the only nexus between the
embassy's Mu Ban Samaki and the CIA's paramilitary effort in Laos.47D
exploited his open, straightforward style and long residence in
Pakse to ingratiate himself with the local potentate, Prince Boun Oum, heir to
the throne of the defunct petty kingdom of Champassak.l
~hen used his
influence to instigate Boun Oum's removal of the obstructionist Gen. Kot
Venevengsos and his replacement as MR 4 commander by the energetic and
cooperative Gen. Phasouk Somly.48D .
. 1 ~lso enjoyed the trust of Charles Mann, USOM chief in Laos, and
the good will of the USOM representative in Pakse. The result was de facto
CIA management of the Houei Kong cluster, and an opportunity to attract
uncommitted villagers with the first set of fully integrated security, intelligence,
economic, and social programs in the Laotian countryside.wD
"I
I
I
"I
"I
I
"I interview,D
I
I
1
SECiUTlfMR
1'{;7