Undercover Armies - CIA FOIA - Central Intelligence Agency

C05303949
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VlETNAMIZATION AND ESCAUlTIOND
siderable pounding in the Washington community for 'unleashing'I_Vjg Pao"
and provoking the "full weight of the North Vietnamese attack."20
Now, two years later, the equation was complicated by the "genuine hope in
many quarters here" for a negotiated cease-fire in north Laos. Some proponents
of this line aspired to some kind of tacit arrangement with the North
Vietnamese, with the United States "restraining Yang, Pao from doing much
more than defending the approaches to Long Tieng in the mountains south and
,west of the [Plain of Jars]." The idea of a Hmong advance onto and beyond
the plain did "not sit well with those who espouse this view." It would be simply
impossible for CIA to "hide behind the notion that [Yang Pao] operates
independently or at the behest of [Souvanna] and we have no element of control."21D
A day later, on 7 July, Washington's Evening Star charged that the Hmong
offensive was courting "massive Hanoi retaliation" like that which had
answered OperationI Iand that it risked killing negotiations
between Vientiane and the Pathet Lao. As the article was being read in Washington-the
State Department expected a "tough time from [the] press and,
possibly Congress"-Yang Pao was once again reminding Tovar and Charge
Stearns that he deferred not only to his American advisers but also to the
prime minister and the king. These two had ordered him to set up "as strong a
defensive position as possible in and around the [Plain of Jars].""D
Washington considered ordering the Mission to threaten Yang Pao with the
withdrawal of tactical air, but forbore after consideration of the likely effect on
his and Hmong morale. In any case, the general acknowledged that his forces
had been moving into a "military vacuum" unlike any earlier such seasonal
void. According to Charge Stearns, he harbored "few illusions" about his ability
to take enemy fortifications north and east of the plain."D
Tovar reported separately, with less emphasis on Yang Pao's responsiveness
to American preferences. He had found it prudent to warn the general that air
support could not be guaranteed for moves against targets like Nong Pet, on ,
Route 7, or Xieng Khouang town. There seemed to be mutual understanding
about the boundaries of US support, but the COS wanted Headquarters to
"bear in mind that Yang Pao is something of a bird dog on a very long
leash."24D
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