22.10.2014 Views

Undercover Armies - CIA FOIA - Central Intelligence Agency

Undercover Armies - CIA FOIA - Central Intelligence Agency

Undercover Armies - CIA FOIA - Central Intelligence Agency

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

Create successful ePaper yourself

Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.

C05303949<br />

Chapter Eighteen<br />

across the border, Hanoi was free to quicken the pace and, in mid-May, drove<br />

the last of Vientiane's forces.off the Bolovens Plateau. 26D<br />

Washington saw the balance of forces in the Panhandle as now dangerously<br />

tilted in favor of Hanoi. The NVA could take Pakse or Savannakhet anytime it<br />

wished; the only question was Hanoi's intentions in the matter. In this climate,<br />

Headquarters judged that the <strong>Agency</strong> had contributed to the imbalance with<br />

excessively ambitious interdiction operations. Conducted with insufficient<br />

reserves to relieve combat-weary units or those under heavy enemy pressure,<br />

these efforts had left MR 4, for example, with only three functioning battalions.<br />

The other seven had to be reorganized and retrained and even that had to<br />

await enough new recruits to fill the gaps in their ranks."D<br />

The NVA decided not to exploit its advanl-~~~~-c-.-.~-c-~~<br />

tage-the onset of the rainy season was doubtless a factor-and as of early<br />

June 1971, the government's position had stabilized in 'both north and south.<br />

Headquarters' fears of a march on the Mekong now gave way to talk in Long<br />

Tieng and Pakse of rainy-season offensives against the communists. In the<br />

north, despite Yang Pao's enduring dream of Hmong mastery of the Plain of<br />

Jars, the objective would be entirely tactical: to push the enemy far enough<br />

from the "heartland" area, south and west of the plain, to deny it the opportunity<br />

for a decisive move against the plain when the weather cleared once<br />

again. In the south, the motivation was more complicated."D<br />

To begin with, Lao proprietary feelings toward the fertile Bolovens Plateau<br />

equaled the Hmong attachment to the Plain of Jars. Also, the Bolovens lay<br />

between the Trail network and Route 13, the main road into northeastern<br />

.Cambodia. Prince Sisouk, Souvanna's deputy defense minister, judged that<br />

the government must hold the plateau at least as far east asPaksong in order to<br />

deny Hanoi easy access into northeastern Cambodia. Finally, there was the<br />

sudden and violent rift between the Pathet Lao and the North Vietnamese in<br />

southern Laos that offered the government the prospect of reclaiming the loyalty<br />

of villagers long under communist sway.29D<br />

L,----------~---J--l<br />

SEri"'TlfMR<br />

r4{4

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!