22.10.2014 Views

Undercover Armies - CIA FOIA - Central Intelligence Agency

Undercover Armies - CIA FOIA - Central Intelligence Agency

Undercover Armies - CIA FOIA - Central Intelligence Agency

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

Create successful ePaper yourself

Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.

C05 303949<br />

Chapter Twelve<br />

Freed prisoners tlf 7f:l/ 1/1 (loll/nIl/IIIIi/IltJ flo,H,<br />

~ JtUIUIIr''Y J% /<br />

out some ambiguities, but had<br />

no alternative to accepting the<br />

new rules of engagement for<br />

SHINING BRASS operations.<br />

In any case, the new<br />

rules were only modestly<br />

more permissive than the old<br />

and looked more like a<br />

bureaucratic compromise<br />

between State and Defense<br />

than like a serious strategy to<br />

interdict the Trail. D 42<br />

However slow the start, the<br />

trend away from guerrilla<br />

warfare would not be reversed<br />

while hostilities continued in<br />

South Vietnam. Conventional<br />

operatio ns would deploy light<br />

infantry trained in multibaltalion parachute and heliborne operations, and these<br />

would require new professional skills in the case officers training and commanding<br />

them. Not many <strong>CIA</strong> officers had the requisite credentials, and the<br />

<strong>Agency</strong> turned to army and marine veterans of combat in Vietnam whom it<br />

hired under contract in the so-calledI ] program. The Agenc sent<br />

them 'all through the standard paramilitary training program a<br />

an<br />

exercise that, in the recollection of one of them, was poorly adapted to operating<br />

conditions in Laos.v0<br />

I<br />

l one of the few contractors without Vietnam experience,<br />

entered the program with no military experience beyond a tour of duty in the<br />

Coast Guard . He left it feeling that he had been "trained for World War II."<br />

The curriculum lacked anything about the communication systems used in<br />

Laos, or about the capabilities and limitations of the various helicopters and<br />

fixed-win<br />

r<br />

aircraft whose use he would be supervising. The introductory<br />

briefing resented at least an up-to-date tactical picture, but offered<br />

nothing about ~ ros pe c t i v e duties at Long Tieng. He asked Landry<br />

what he'd be doing there, and Pat grunted, "Figure it out yourself when you<br />

get there." Landry knew that ' would get the guidance he needed from<br />

the exceptionally capable andl !eventually<br />

came to see considerable merit in the station's informal regime of on-the ­<br />

job training. 44~<br />

..L,<br />

4} Jim O"Ie-=-ru"'m,,";r-- ...r--intervicw by (he author, Mclean, VA. 17 March 1999 (hereafter cited<br />

as ntervicw)<br />

SEJlETIIMR<br />

/ 270

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!