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Undercover Armies - CIA FOIA - Central Intelligence Agency

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C051303949<br />

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did his interpreter. Dedicated and intense,Dsaw Yang Pao's one-man-band<br />

style of leadership as hopelessly inadequate, involving an impossibly broad<br />

span of control. His constant hectoring of Yang Pao to set up a conventional<br />

four-part military staff strained the relationship between the two, especially<br />

when it took place with Hmong or Lao subordinates present. In fact, Yang Pao<br />

lacked people qualified to function like professionals in a Western army. More<br />

importantly, the Hmong leader was as much tribal leader as military commander,<br />

and his political authority rested on a charisma that needed constant<br />

exercise if it were not to decay."D<br />

An adviser had to deal not only with YangPao and his rudimentary staff but<br />

with the volunteer irregulars as well. Nearly all illiterate and with only rudimentary<br />

training, they displayed astonishing speed and endurance as they traversed<br />

mountain ridges carrying weapons and ammunition. Their cheerful<br />

acceptance of extraordinarily harsh conditions and their abiding hatred of the<br />

Vietnamese had to compensate for their lack of conventional military discipline<br />

and their indifference to any goal broader than securing their families<br />

and their way of life."0<br />

For a few advisers, cultural disparities like these were to be ignored--eradicated,<br />

if possible-as they converted their tribal clients into a smaller version<br />

of US Marines.1<br />

lattempt to do this ran up against both the<br />

cultural barrier and a charismatic leader's need never to lose face with his<br />

inferiors. D<br />

I<br />

IThe officers who followed, most of<br />

them requested by Bill Lair, had a beller capacity for cross-cultural empathy<br />

and,I<br />

Irequired only cursory<br />

briefing before being dispatched into the mountains. Several had been<br />

recruited, like Lair in the early 1950s, out of Texas A&M University, where<br />

two or three-including Lloyd "Pat" Landry-had played varsity football.<br />

Another,I<br />

Ihad been a master sergeant in the US Army Special<br />

Forces before joining the <strong>Agency</strong>. Still another, Jack Shirley, was a New<br />

England native who, like Lair, had married a Thai girl and made a career of<br />

paramilitary wor~" I<br />

IRON AGE GUERRIUAS0"<br />

5S Ibid,'§nterview.<br />

36 Bill Lair<br />

D<br />

57 Ibid; interview; author's recollection. One of the A&M men.1 ~laYed<br />

brieflyfor the NFL'sDetroitLionsbeforejoining the <strong>Agency</strong>. ( ]intervlew.) Both ir and<br />

Shirley married into the families~rominent members of the Free Thai resistance to the Japanese<br />

occupation in World War II.l-J<br />

SEC1T/fMR<br />

'(;9

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