Undercover Armies - CIA FOIA - Central Intelligence Agency

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Ignoring I I recommendation
to avoid mentioning the
Hmong, the DCI acknowledged
the Agency's feeling of responsibility
toward them. He exhorted
Souvanna to recognize, in turn,
Hmong potential to bolster a truly
neutralist government. Personalizing
the matter in his usual fashion,
Souvanna dismissed the implication
that he might doubt Hmong
loyalty: Touby Lyfoung, their
chief, "was loyal to him, indeed
had been brought up by him." The
delivery of relief supplies, therefore,
would be no problem.CJ
NEW RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
On the matter of expelling the
; \.
Yang Pao and Touby Lsfoung (r) at Hmong ceremony,
mid-J960s (Courtesy afBill Lair)
North Vietnamese presence, Souvanna
was as vague as expected,
but McCone thought the session ~
succeeded in diminishing his "distrust
of the CIA and contributed to his confidence in the intentions of the US
Government." And VangPao, atClA's urging, accepted Souvanna's invitation
to a mid-August meeting in Vientiane;I Ithought Vang Pao now
accepted that it lay in the Hmong's interest for him to support the new prime
ministe~7c===J
Changing the GuardD
The Geneva Agreements dissolved an ineffective but resolutely anticommunist
and antineutralist regime. Replacing it was a coalition of mutually
antagonistic elements, for the Kong Le neutralists, allied with Souvanna
Phouma, were already disaffected with their Pathet Lao partners. Control of
key ministries-Defense and Interior-was to be shared among the three parties,
which promised immobility at best, open conflict at worst.D
6 Memorandum for the Record. "Highlights," FRUS. 28 July 1962J
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~s'for being "brought up" by Souvanna, Touby was only nine
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