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Company Valuation Under IFRS : Interpreting and Forecasting ...

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Chapter Six – The awkward squad<br />

the interest charge that attaches to the PBO of a pension scheme, discussed in<br />

Chapter four, or the movement in the embedded value of a life insurance<br />

company, to be discussed in a later section of this chapter.)<br />

The solution is to adjust both numbers. We want our profit to reflect not merely<br />

that which has been realised but also the movement in the value of our reserves,<br />

adjusted for costs capitalised during the year. These comprise costs incurred<br />

minus exploration costs expensed directly. And we want our return to be<br />

calculated by dividing profit by the opportunity cost of our reserves at the start<br />

of the year, for which we shall take the SEC discounted value as a proxy. The<br />

point is that we could in theory sell our reserves at this value. If we keep them<br />

<strong>and</strong> run the company as a going concern, then it is presumably because we can<br />

earn an acceptable return on the fair value of the capital.<br />

The adjustments are shown on page four, <strong>and</strong> the result is that our capital is now<br />

valued at $99 billion, <strong>and</strong> that the return made during 2003 on the opening figure<br />

of $97 billion drops to 7.8 per cent. In fairness, this was after an unrealised loss<br />

of $7 billion, because capitalised costs exceeded increase in the value of the<br />

reserves by $7 billion. Movements in reserve values are very volatile, <strong>and</strong> it is<br />

probably not realistic to assume that a well-managed company will continue on<br />

average to generate negative net present values when it invests.<br />

Pursuing this analysis would require us to take a longer term view of Exxon’s<br />

historical performance <strong>and</strong> to make explicit assumptions about future value<br />

added that go beyond the space that we can allocate here. For the reasons<br />

discussed earlier, the SEC valuation of Exxon’s reserves will be substantially<br />

below a fair market value, because of the restrictiveness of the reserve definition,<br />

<strong>and</strong> the high discount rate applied to forecast cash flows. Suffice it to say that<br />

analysing Exxon’s upstream assets with a base assumption that they are worth<br />

some $100 billion, plus whatever adjustment for conservatism is deemed<br />

reasonable, but that the company earns close to its cost of capital on its<br />

incremental investments, is a much better set of working assumptions than that<br />

its assets are worth only $50 billion <strong>and</strong> that it is generating almost 30 per cent<br />

returns on incremental capital. If the latter were the case then its slow growth <strong>and</strong><br />

large returns of capital to its investors would be unintelligible. They are not.<br />

2.6 Some further thoughts on accounting issues in<br />

extractive <strong>and</strong> energy sectors<br />

The advent of <strong>IFRS</strong> has produced significant interest in accounting issues for a<br />

variety of sectors, including oil, gas <strong>and</strong> mining. Interestingly there is a large<br />

IASB project in progress on this industry. In general terms the project group has<br />

made it clear that:<br />

1. The primary financial statements of an extractive industries enterprise<br />

should be based on historical costs, not on estimated reserve values.<br />

271

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