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Company Valuation Under IFRS : Interpreting and Forecasting ...

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<strong>Company</strong> valuation under <strong>IFRS</strong><br />

Well, actually, the answer is no. To see why, it is necessary to split the acquisition<br />

into its component parts: an investment decision <strong>and</strong> a financing decision. Taking<br />

the second one first, is it a good idea, if your share price is high, to use shares to<br />

buy things, or even to use the opportunity to accumulate some cash? Answer, yes.<br />

Taking the first one, is it a good idea, as a result of your being able to raise equity<br />

capital on good terms, to throw away half of this benefit by purchasing something<br />

at twice its fair value? Answer, no. Countless managements have made bad<br />

acquisitions through confusing investment with financing decisions, <strong>and</strong> this is a<br />

similar argument to the one we have already addressed regarding the appropriate<br />

discount rate for appraising targets.<br />

It is always essential to separate investment from financing decisions <strong>and</strong> it is<br />

usually wrong to make a bad investment decision merely on the basis of<br />

arguments about financing. The gain created by tax shelters, for example, should<br />

also not be used to justify otherwise expensive acquisitions.<br />

9.3 Bidding for Metro<br />

Metro is the company that we have modelled in greatest detail, <strong>and</strong> we shall<br />

analyse it as a potential acquisition target for the US giant, Wal-Mart. As already<br />

discussed, detailed consolidations come later. The first question for Wal-Mart<br />

would be, ‘What would we be prepared to pay?’<br />

Our earlier valuation of Metro in Exhibit 5.2 generated a value per share of<br />

€46.06 per share, on the important assumption that we held market gearing stable<br />

into the future. Let us return to it <strong>and</strong> begin with some assumptions about what<br />

the change of ownership could plausibly do to the Metro business.<br />

Cross-selling opportunities would be limited in this case, so we would be reduced<br />

to an estimate of what a possibly more aggressive management could achieve<br />

with the existing business. We shall assume that an uplift to projected revenues<br />

of 1 per cent is projected.<br />

More might plausibly be done with costs, especially fixed costs. In reality, there<br />

are three lines of fixed cost that could be attacked, but to keep the modelling<br />

down we shall ascribe all the benefits to general administrative expenses, <strong>and</strong><br />

shall assume that these could be halved. We assume no change to cost of goods<br />

sold through lower procurement costs.<br />

Exhibit 7.15 contains two additional pages of Metro model. The first (page 15)<br />

shows the effect of the synergies described above on after-tax profits <strong>and</strong> cash<br />

flows. The second (Page 16) shows a reworking of the valuation table from<br />

Exhibit 5.2, but this time with NOPAT reflecting the synergies form the merger.<br />

Our value per share has risen by 50 per cent from €46.06 to €68.90.<br />

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