In Search of Enemies - A CIA Story - John Stockwell
In Search of Enemies - A CIA Story - John Stockwell
In Search of Enemies - A CIA Story - John Stockwell
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Kinshasa<br />
consular <strong>of</strong>ficers; others will be businessmen, pr<strong>of</strong>essors, students, or<br />
tourists. But they will still be conspicuously "<strong>CIA</strong>" to all who work<br />
with or near them, in the embassies, in Washington, or in the local<br />
communities overseas.<br />
Few experienced <strong>CIA</strong> case <strong>of</strong>ficers will ever be enthusiastic about<br />
acting as an "agent" in a dangerous situation. They know too well<br />
how agents are sometimes abused. by the <strong>CIA</strong>. For example, one<br />
extremely valuable Vietnamese agent had for years reported accurately<br />
on the communist high command. He became so famous<br />
inside the agency that he was discussed openly at headquarters and<br />
in Saigon, even at social functions in front <strong>of</strong> nonagency Americans<br />
and foreigners. At headquarters he was commonly cited by lecturers<br />
in the Vietnam orientation seminar, attended by a wide variety <strong>of</strong><br />
people outside the DDO. This insecure, unpr<strong>of</strong>essional conduct was<br />
a clear threat to the agent's life as well as to his viability as a<br />
reporting asset. The case <strong>of</strong>ficer tried to deal with it through the chief<br />
<strong>of</strong> station, but the COS refused to take any action, claiming that an<br />
effort to quiet the gossip would only provoke more.<br />
At the same time in the COS's <strong>of</strong>fice, there was another top-secret<br />
operation which was handled much differently-a friend warned me<br />
to quit asking about it lest I be ordered out <strong>of</strong> the country by the COS.<br />
Eventually, I learned about it from an <strong>of</strong>ficer who worked with me up<br />
country. On a previous tour my friend had helped install "bugs" in the<br />
South Vietnamese presidential palace.* The <strong>CIA</strong> was eavesdropping<br />
on President Thieu's private conversations. Security <strong>of</strong> the two operations<br />
differed as night from day, precisely because exposure <strong>of</strong> the<br />
audio operation against Thieu would be sensational news, embarrassing<br />
to the United States president, and possibly fatal to the COS's<br />
career; the agent, on the other hand, though he was providing incomparable<br />
intelligence, was not a political entity. His exposure would be<br />
an inconvenience, but not a catastrophe, except to himself.<br />
The Kinshasa station <strong>of</strong>fices on the second floor <strong>of</strong> the embassy<br />
had changed little since my last visit six years before. I found the<br />
deputy COS working at his desk, waiting for me. He <strong>of</strong>fered to lock<br />
up any notes I had, but declined to stop somewhere for a drink and<br />
a chat about Kinshasa.<br />
He would instead drive me to St. Martin's villa. On the way to the<br />
*The <strong>CIA</strong> had given Thieu presents <strong>of</strong> TV sets and furniture which were bugged.