In Search of Enemies - A CIA Story - John Stockwell
In Search of Enemies - A CIA Story - John Stockwell
In Search of Enemies - A CIA Story - John Stockwell
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Postscript [253]<br />
the <strong>CIA</strong> is essential to our national security.<br />
Where is the ancient American skepticism, the "show-me" attitude<br />
for which our pioneer forefathers were famous? We only need<br />
the <strong>CIA</strong> if it contributes positively to our national interests. Obviously,<br />
our nation needs broad intelligence coverage, and we have<br />
been getting it. It comes through the Directorate <strong>of</strong> <strong>In</strong>formation <strong>of</strong><br />
the <strong>CIA</strong>, the central intelligence <strong>of</strong>fice which collates, analyses, and<br />
disseminates information from all sources. Our presidents receive the<br />
DDI reports and briefings and, with some misgivings about their<br />
quality,* insist that they are essential to the wise functioning <strong>of</strong> that<br />
<strong>of</strong>fice. But even presidents forget to distinguish between the Directorate<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>In</strong>formation and the clandestine services, quite possibly not<br />
realizing how little <strong>of</strong> the DDl's information actually comes from the<br />
covert human agents <strong>of</strong> its shadowy alter ego. The bulk <strong>of</strong> all raw<br />
intelligence, including vital strategic information, comes from overt<br />
sources and from the enormously expensive technical collection systems.<br />
The human agents, the spies, contribute less than 10 percent,<br />
a trivial part <strong>of</strong> the information which is reliable and <strong>of</strong> national<br />
security importance. Good agent penetrations <strong>of</strong> the "hard targets,"<br />
individual spies who have confirmed access to strategic information,<br />
who are reliable, and who manage to report on a timely basis, are<br />
extremely rare. It is a shocking truth that the clandestine services<br />
have failed to recruit good agents in Moscow (Pentkovsky and Popov<br />
walked in on the British service which shared them with the <strong>CIA</strong>).<br />
It has failed completely in China-not even a walk-in. <strong>In</strong> Pyongyang,<br />
North Korea-not one Korean agent. And <strong>CIA</strong> case <strong>of</strong>ficers are<br />
literally afraid <strong>of</strong> the Mafia, the Chinese Tongs, and the international<br />
drug runners. They have recruited scores <strong>of</strong> thousands <strong>of</strong> Third<br />
World politicians, rebels, and European businessmen, whose voluminous<br />
reporting scarcely justifies the clandestine services' existence.<br />
<strong>In</strong> March 1976 President Ford reorganized the National Security<br />
Council, renaming the 40 Committee, calling it the Operations<br />
Advisory Group. At that time he expanded the <strong>CIA</strong> charter,<br />
authorizing it to intervene even in countries which are<br />
friendly to the United States, and in those which are not threatened<br />
by internal subversion.<br />
<strong>In</strong> January 1977, at the crest <strong>of</strong> two years <strong>of</strong> exposure <strong>of</strong> its short-<br />
*See Armies <strong>of</strong> Ignorance, William Corson (New York: Dial, 1977).