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In Search of Enemies - A CIA Story - John Stockwell

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Postscript [253]<br />

the <strong>CIA</strong> is essential to our national security.<br />

Where is the ancient American skepticism, the "show-me" attitude<br />

for which our pioneer forefathers were famous? We only need<br />

the <strong>CIA</strong> if it contributes positively to our national interests. Obviously,<br />

our nation needs broad intelligence coverage, and we have<br />

been getting it. It comes through the Directorate <strong>of</strong> <strong>In</strong>formation <strong>of</strong><br />

the <strong>CIA</strong>, the central intelligence <strong>of</strong>fice which collates, analyses, and<br />

disseminates information from all sources. Our presidents receive the<br />

DDI reports and briefings and, with some misgivings about their<br />

quality,* insist that they are essential to the wise functioning <strong>of</strong> that<br />

<strong>of</strong>fice. But even presidents forget to distinguish between the Directorate<br />

<strong>of</strong> <strong>In</strong>formation and the clandestine services, quite possibly not<br />

realizing how little <strong>of</strong> the DDl's information actually comes from the<br />

covert human agents <strong>of</strong> its shadowy alter ego. The bulk <strong>of</strong> all raw<br />

intelligence, including vital strategic information, comes from overt<br />

sources and from the enormously expensive technical collection systems.<br />

The human agents, the spies, contribute less than 10 percent,<br />

a trivial part <strong>of</strong> the information which is reliable and <strong>of</strong> national<br />

security importance. Good agent penetrations <strong>of</strong> the "hard targets,"<br />

individual spies who have confirmed access to strategic information,<br />

who are reliable, and who manage to report on a timely basis, are<br />

extremely rare. It is a shocking truth that the clandestine services<br />

have failed to recruit good agents in Moscow (Pentkovsky and Popov<br />

walked in on the British service which shared them with the <strong>CIA</strong>).<br />

It has failed completely in China-not even a walk-in. <strong>In</strong> Pyongyang,<br />

North Korea-not one Korean agent. And <strong>CIA</strong> case <strong>of</strong>ficers are<br />

literally afraid <strong>of</strong> the Mafia, the Chinese Tongs, and the international<br />

drug runners. They have recruited scores <strong>of</strong> thousands <strong>of</strong> Third<br />

World politicians, rebels, and European businessmen, whose voluminous<br />

reporting scarcely justifies the clandestine services' existence.<br />

<strong>In</strong> March 1976 President Ford reorganized the National Security<br />

Council, renaming the 40 Committee, calling it the Operations<br />

Advisory Group. At that time he expanded the <strong>CIA</strong> charter,<br />

authorizing it to intervene even in countries which are<br />

friendly to the United States, and in those which are not threatened<br />

by internal subversion.<br />

<strong>In</strong> January 1977, at the crest <strong>of</strong> two years <strong>of</strong> exposure <strong>of</strong> its short-<br />

*See Armies <strong>of</strong> Ignorance, William Corson (New York: Dial, 1977).

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