In Search of Enemies - A CIA Story - John Stockwell
In Search of Enemies - A CIA Story - John Stockwell
In Search of Enemies - A CIA Story - John Stockwell
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(200] IN SEARCH OF ENEMIES<br />
which suggested lines to be used in formal press statements: We<br />
could refuse to comment. We could categorically deny U.S. involvement.<br />
Or we could state that the United States had supported the<br />
Alvor Accord, which permitted the three liberation movements to<br />
participate equally in preparing Angola for independence, but the<br />
Soviet Union had delivered -arms to the MPLA, producing heavy<br />
fighting. Angola's neighbors were concerned that the Soviet Union<br />
was attempting to carve out a dominant position in Angola. We<br />
would add that we were sympathetic but we had not supplied U.S.<br />
arms to any <strong>of</strong> the liberation movements. Whichever, we should<br />
emphasize the Soviet Union, so it would not look as though we were<br />
attacking a minor liberation movement.<br />
The State Department a few days later reported it had issued a<br />
statement refusing to substantiate press inquiries and denying United<br />
States involvement:<br />
We have not been in the business <strong>of</strong> providing arms to the Angolan<br />
movements. However, we have received reports that one <strong>of</strong> the movements,<br />
the MPLA, has for some time been receiving large shipments<br />
<strong>of</strong> weapons from the Soviet Union. It is understandable if African<br />
governments are concerned about this development and we are sympa·<br />
thetic to those concerns.<br />
<strong>In</strong> the field our security was fairly good. We and our allies had<br />
contro] over the only transportation into the fighting areas, especially<br />
into Silva Porto, and could restrict those areas from all but a few<br />
selected reporters or the extremely hardy individuals who were willing<br />
to go i.n overland. However, one European reporter, whom we<br />
knew only as Germani, began focusing on Kinshasa itself and was<br />
scurrying about town with a good instinct for where we were hiding<br />
the stories. The Kinshasa station report1ed his presence and the working<br />
group discussed the threat he posed. It would be easy to have<br />
Mobutu throw him out <strong>of</strong> the country. Could we get by with asking<br />
Mobutu to do it? Germani wasn't American. Did we dare have<br />
cables on record ordering the station to pull strings and have a<br />
legitimate European reporter thrown out <strong>of</strong> Kinshasa? The press<br />
would be extremely angry if it ever found out. The working group<br />
stalled, wondering why the field hadn't thought <strong>of</strong> this solution<br />
without headquarters' guidance. They were in daily contact with<br />
Roberto and his deputies and could easily plant the idea. They could