In Search of Enemies - A CIA Story - John Stockwell
In Search of Enemies - A CIA Story - John Stockwell
In Search of Enemies - A CIA Story - John Stockwell
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Footsoldiers <strong>of</strong> Foreign Policy<br />
don't put all the blame on Kissinger, the <strong>CIA</strong> led the United States<br />
into the Angolan mess," she added.<br />
The Portuguese coup was April 25, 1974. But in 1973 Roberto had<br />
already begun accepting arms from the Chinese. On May 29, 1974,<br />
the first contingent <strong>of</strong> 112 Chinese military advisors, led by a major<br />
general <strong>of</strong> the Chinese army, arrived in Zaire to train the FNLA<br />
forces. The Chinese issued a press release announcing the arrival <strong>of</strong><br />
these advisors. <strong>In</strong> July 1974 the <strong>CIA</strong> began funding Roberto without<br />
40 Committee approval, small amounts at first, but enough for word<br />
to get around that the <strong>CIA</strong> was dealing itself into the race. <strong>In</strong> August<br />
the Communist party <strong>of</strong> the Soviet Union announced that it considered<br />
the MPLA to be the true spokesman <strong>of</strong> the Angolan people.<br />
The Soviets began flying arms to Dar-es-Salaam designated for<br />
" African liberation movements''; the <strong>CIA</strong> could only speculate<br />
whether they were for Rhodesian and South African movements or<br />
the MPLA on the other side <strong>of</strong> the continent. On August 28 the<br />
Kinshasa press announced that the Rumanian communist party had<br />
presented a large quantity <strong>of</strong> military equipment to the FNLA. On<br />
September 10, the FNLA publicly acknowledged the receipt <strong>of</strong> 450<br />
tons <strong>of</strong> supplies from China.<br />
During the fall <strong>of</strong> 1974 the <strong>CIA</strong> continued to fund Roberto, still<br />
without 40 Committee approval, and its intelligence reporting on<br />
Angola was predominantly from Zairian and FNLA sources. Most<br />
important, MacElhinney emphasized, the flagrant, semiovert activities<br />
<strong>of</strong> the <strong>CIA</strong> station in Kinshasa ensured that American support<br />
<strong>of</strong> the FNLA would be widely known. There was reporting that the<br />
Soviet Union began filtering limited amounts <strong>of</strong> arms to the MPLA<br />
late in 1974.<br />
<strong>In</strong> the Alvor agreement, January 15, 1975, the three movements<br />
agreed to compete peacefully for elections to be held in October 1975.<br />
Every indication was that UNIT A and the MPLA acted in good<br />
faith, although no one could deny the likelihood <strong>of</strong> violence if one<br />
party threatened to dominate the elections.<br />
On January 22, 1975, the 40 Committee authorized the <strong>CIA</strong> to pass<br />
$300,000 to the FNLA, which was historically the most warlike <strong>of</strong><br />
the movements and which was thought to have the largest army. <strong>In</strong><br />
February 1975, encouraged by Mobutu and the United States<br />
Roberto moved his well-armed forces into Angola and began attacking<br />
the MPLA in Luanda and northern Angola. <strong>In</strong> one instance in