In Search of Enemies - A CIA Story - John Stockwell

IN SEARCH OF ENEMIES
and Costello had reservations about it. How many others? Was there
any chance for secrecy in a highly controversial program?
I turned to the 40 Committee options paper. It had been drafted
by Africa Division of the CIA, on July 14, two weeks earlier, and
began with a summary paragraph which concluded that Neto's
forces appeared strong enough to take the Angolan capital, Luanda,
and surrounding areas. Mobutu was exhausted economically and
could no longer support Holden Roberto. Roberto did not have
countrywide political support. It further postulated that financial
and some limited material support to Roberto and Savimbi could
establish a military balance and discourage further resort to arms in
Angola. Such covert financial assistance, it continued, would prevent
the quick and cheap installation in Angola of what Mobutu and
Kaunda would regard as a pawn of Moscow on their borders.
By putting in a little money and arms we would discourage further
resort to arms? President Johnson had called that "controlled escalation0
in Vietnam. Why did the 40 Committee think it would work
in Angola?
The paper went on to review the recent developments in Angola,
and noted that Roberto had been given $265,000, with 40 Committee
approval, since January 22, 1975, to make him competitive in the
transitional government. It then listed four· options for the United
States in Angola: (a) limited financial support for political activity;
Jb) substantial financial support and covert action designed to redress
the balance, costing $6 million; (c) larger amounts of money
(s14 million) and material to give Savimbi and Roberto superiority
over Neto-providing the USSR did not escalate its assistance to the
MPLA; (d) sufficient support to sustain Roberto and Savimbi's armies
for a year, costing s40 million. The latter, the paper stated,
would likely match any Soviet escalation. There was no indication
of how this estimate of Soviet response had been developed.
A fifth option, of staying out of the conflict altogether, was not
mentioned. Clearly, the United States wanted this war. Conspicuously,
we had made no move to work through the Organization of
African Unity, the United Nations, or bilaterally with the Soviet
Union to end the arms race.
The paper discussed the risks, concluding that the security of our
program would be better protected if the Angolans got arms which
had belonged to the Zairian army rather than from the USA. Offi-