In Search of Enemies - A CIA Story - John Stockwell

Advisors, Technicians, and Foreign Troops
The easiest solution was for the CIA to place its own paramilitary
experts with the FNLA and UNIT A commands. This was strictly
prohibited by the 40 Committee, which wanted no Americans directly
involved in the fighting, but we did it anyway. From the outset
we were deeply involved in managing the war from Washington,
from Kinshasa, and from advance bases inside Angola, and this was
reported daily in the flow of cables to -and from the field. For cover
purposes vis-a-vis the working group we called the advisors we
placed inside Angola "intelligence gatherers," although their intelligence
effort was always subordinate to their advisory activities.
To cite a few examples: In early August the chief of Special Operations
Group (SOG), the marine major, myself, and others met at
headquarters to discuss requirements for the battle of Lobito and
sabotage operations to be run in Congo (Brazzaville). We relayed our
recommendations to the field by cable. CIA communications specialists
prepared the tactical communications plan for the battle of
Lobito, and then instalJed the UNIT A and FNLA tactical and strategic
networks inside Angola. CIA communications officers trained
FNLA and UNIT A technicians at the Angolan advance bases. Kinshasa
cables reported that CIA paramilitary officers were training
UNIT A forces in Silva Porto and the FNLA in Ambriz in the use
of infantry weapons. A retired army colonel was hired on contract
and assigned full time to the FNLA command a(Ambriz. An infantry
training team was sent from headquarters, allegedly to train
selected UNIT A cadres in Zaire, but the Kinshasa station promptly
dispatched the training officers to Ambriz and Silva Porto. On October
31 the COS Kinshasa flew to Ambriz to mediate a quarrel between
the CIA senior advisor and Roberto.•
The DDO gave the officers who were working inside Angola authority
to go about armed.•• In many cases they also wore utility
*In Honorable Men, Colby states, "no CIA officers were permitted to engage in
combat or train there [in Angola]."
•*The DDO is under constant pressure from field stations to approve sidearms for
case officers. I always argued that case officers should not be armed. Gun laws are
stricter in European and African countries than in the United States, and pistols
require licenses and permits. Diplomats are among the last to carry guns. How does
a case officer explain to the local police he thinks he needs a pistol? Does he say,
.. Well, I have to go down these dark alleys every night meeting agents . . . "? If he
carries one illegally, all of the risks of exposure are magnified. What if he shoots