In Search of Enemies - A CIA Story - John Stockwell

(186) IN SEARCH OF ENEMIES
concessions. In Angola, however, it felt there were sound reasons for
military intervention. There were masses of Angolan refugees to
succor. The million-dollar hydroelectric plant it was building at
Cunene in southern Angola required protection. SW APO (South
West African People's Organization) guerrilla bases in Angola could
be destroyed. Most important, of course, was the temptation to
influence the outcome of the Angolan civil war in favor of Savimbi,
who was considered the most likely to establish a government in
Luanda which would cooperate with South Africa.
The South Africans had some encouragement to go into Angola.
Savimbi invited them, after conferring with Mobutu, Kaunda, Felix
Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast, and Leopold Senghor of
Senegal, all of whom favored a moderate, pro-West government in
Angola. I saw no evidence that the United States formally encouraged
them to join the conflict.
The South Africans hoped to gain sympathy from the West by
supporting the same side as the Zairians, Zambians, and United
States in the Angolan conflict. They felt that their troops, even
though white, would be more acceptable to most African leaders
than the non-African Cubans. They also expected to be successful,
understanding that the Ford administration would obtain U.S congressional
support for an effective Angola program. On all three
points they were disastrously wrong.
Eschewing hawkish plans for a decisive military strike, South
African Prime Minister John Vorster opted for a small, covert task
force. Only light armor and artillery would be used; there would be
no tanks, infantry, or fighter bomber aircraft. Posing as mercenaries
and remaining behind the UNIT A troops, the soldiers would remain
invisible. A curtain of silence in Pretoria would further protect them.
The task force would do the job and withdraw quickly, before the
November n independence date.
The South African government was playing a dangerous game.
With scarcely a friend in the world, it was inviting further condemnation
by intervening in a black African country. And it was forced
to run its program covertly, like the CIA, concealing it from its own
people. Only recently, in March 1975, had it withdrawn its forces
from Rhodesia, and racist whites would question why their sons were
now fighting for black freedom in Angola. Still, South Africa entered
the war, watching the United States program closely and hoping for