In Search of Enemies - A CIA Story - John Stockwell

The Angola Program (43]
"We may very well preside over the death of the CIA." he said
bitterly.
Carl insisted that it was Kissinger who was pushing the agency
into the covert operation in Angola. Kissinger saw the Angolan
conflict solely in terms of global politics and was determined the
Soviets should not be permitted to make a move in any remote part
of the world without being confronted militarily by the United
States.* Superficially, his opposition to the Soviet presence was being
rationalized in terms of Angola's strategic location on the South
Atlantic, near the shipping lanes of the giant tankers which bring oil
from the Middle East around the horn of Africa to the United States.
This argument was not profound. Soviet bases in Somalia had much
better control of our shipping lanes, and any military move by the
Soviets against our oil supplies would trigger a reaction so vigorous
that a Soviet base in Angola would be a trivial factor. In fact, Angola
had little plausible importance to American national security and
little economic importance beyond the robusta coffee it sold to
American markets and the relatively small amounts of petroleum
Gulf Oil pumped from the Cabindan fields.
No. Uncomfortable with recent historic events, and frustrated by
our humiliation in Vietnam, Kissinger was seeking opportunities to
challenge the Soviets. Conspicuously, he had overruled his advisors
and refused to seek diplomatic solutions in Angola. The question
was, would the American people, so recently traumatized by Vietnam,
tolerate even a modest involvement in another remote, confusing,
Third World civil war? Carl Bantam and I did not think so.
The United States' troubled relations with Zaire also facilitated
Kissinger's desire to act in Angola. Both Zaire and Zambia feared
the prospect of a Soviet-backed government on their flanks, controlling
the Benguela railroad. President Mobutu was especially afraid
of the Soviets. Twice since 1960 he had broken relations with the
Soviet Union, and although relations were reestablished each time,
he had more recently been courting the Chinese at the expense of
both the Soviets and the Americans. In the spring of 1975, Zaire's
internal problems had mounted until Mobutu's regime was threatened
by discontent. After fifteen years, Zairian agriculture had never
*This is also the rationale for the Angola operation which Colby gives in Honorable
M en (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1978), pp. 439-40.