In Search of Enemies - A CIA Story - John Stockwell

[90] IN SEARCH OF ENEMIES
understanding with Mobutu that no CIA arms would go directly into
Angola.
In sum it illustrated the CIA's willingness to deceive a State Department
principal officer in a war-torn post that was controlled by
our enemy, in this case the MPLA. Obviously our arms would not
promote a peaceful solution, they added fuel to the bloody conflict.
And it was more than a resupply operation. From the first airplane
loads in July, throughout the war, CIA officers supervised the transshipment
of CIA arms directly into Angola.
By the end of the second week, ten days after I had come up from
Texas, the task force was lodged in a smaU office which was
"vaulted," i.e., protected by a combination of tun1bler locks and
electronic sensors. Once the vault was secured at night, any unauthorized
entry and even a movement as slight as a falling piece of
paper would trigger alarms in the office of security. I had been joined
by seven case officers, two assistants, and two secretaries. Among the
officers were three of Bantam's proteges: one spoke Korean as a
second language, another Japanese, and none was familiar with
Africa. One of them advertised his special status by establishing
bankers' hours, coming to work as late as 10:00 A.M. and leaving
around 5:00-making it clear that he had "protection." The second
spent hours filling, tamping, and lighting his pipe, while visiting with
anyone that walked past. The third joined Laura and others by
plunging into task-force activities, arriving early, staying late, and
turning out good work. Thanks to their efforts the task force was
functional, and in time would even achieve a certain frantic efficiency.
As I began to learn my way around Angolan matters I became
aware of a major problem. The glaring weakness of the program was
a lack of information about our allies and about the interior of
Angola. We were mounting a major covert action to support two
Angolan liberation movements about which we had little reliable
intelligence. Most of what we knew about the FNLA came from
Roberto, the chief recipient of our largesse, and it was obvious that
he was exaggerating and distorting facts in order to keep our support.
We knew even less about Savimbi and UNIT A. I planned to fill this
intelligence gap by sending someone into the guerrilla base camps
inside Angola. My first candidate for that mission was myself.