In Search of Enemies - A CIA Story - John Stockwell
In Search of Enemies - A CIA Story - John Stockwell
In Search of Enemies - A CIA Story - John Stockwell
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Author's Note<br />
Oth~~ad reached the same conclusion.j>hilip Agee ~sed his<br />
!?ook[jnside the Comp_an2: A Cl~i_E~ a sword to slash at the<br />
~ncy. to put it out <strong>of</strong> business in Latin America. Deeply <strong>of</strong>fended<br />
by the <strong>CIA</strong>'s clandestine activities, Agee attacked individual operations<br />
and agents, publishing every name he could remember. Although<br />
he made an effort to explain how and why he became disillusioned,<br />
he did not illuminate the <strong>CIA</strong> "mind." Marchetti and Snep,Q<br />
contributed valuable information to th ublic's knowledge <strong>of</strong> the<br />
<strong>CIA</strong>. 'h 'A an t e u o ntelli enc includes a vast store <strong>of</strong><br />
information about the agency, drawn from Marchetti's experience in<br />
the DDI and in the <strong>of</strong>fice <strong>of</strong> the director <strong>of</strong> central intelligence.<br />
Snepp, for six years an analyst in the <strong>CIA</strong>'s Saigon station, chronicles<br />
the intelligence failure and betrayals <strong>of</strong> the <strong>CIA</strong> evacuation <strong>of</strong> South<br />
Vietnam in April 1975.<br />
My objective in writing this book is to give the American public<br />
a candid glimpse inside the clandestine mind, behind the last veils<br />
<strong>of</strong> secrecy. The vehicle I chose is the Angola paramilitary program<br />
<strong>of</strong> 1975-1976. The anecdotes I relate all happened as described. Dates<br />
and details are drawn from the public record and from voluminous<br />
notes I took during the Angola operation. <strong>In</strong> most cases there were<br />
other witnesses and <strong>of</strong>ten enough secret files to corroborate them.<br />
However, for reasons <strong>of</strong> security, I was not able to interview key<br />
individuals or return to the <strong>CIA</strong> for further research as I wrote. I<br />
urge the <strong>CIA</strong> to supplement my observations by opening its Angola<br />
files-the <strong>of</strong>ficial files as well as the abundant "so ff' files we keptso<br />
the public can have the fullest, most detailed truth.<br />
Our libel laws restrict an author's freedom to relate much <strong>of</strong><br />
human foible. Nevertheless I have managed to include enough anecdotes<br />
to give the reader a full taste <strong>of</strong> the things we did, the people<br />
we were. But this is not so much a story <strong>of</strong> individual eccentricities<br />
and strange behavior, though I mention some. I have no desire to<br />
expose or hurt individuals and I reject Agee's approach. As a case<br />
<strong>of</strong>ficer for twelve years I was both victim and villain in <strong>CIA</strong> operations.<br />
<strong>In</strong> both roles I was keenly sympathetic for the people we<br />
ensnarled in our activities. Perhaps they are responsible according to<br />
the principles <strong>of</strong> Nuremburg and Watergate-which judged lesser<br />
employees individually responsible and put them in jail-but I prefer<br />
to address the issues at a broader level. Since my resignation I have<br />
revealed no covert <strong>CIA</strong> employee or agent's name, and I stonewalled