In Search of Enemies - A CIA Story - John Stockwell

(180] IN SEARCH OF ENEMIES
stand the situation and skirt the brink of global confrontation with
the Soviet Union); the 1974 coup in Portugal (which the CIA failed
to predict or analyze correctly, leaving the United States without
prepared options for dealing with Portuguese colonies in Africa); the
first nuclear explosion in the Third World, in India in 1974; and the
overthrow of Archbishop Makarios in Cyprus (an intelligence failure
which precipitated a diplomatic failure, which seriously undermined
NATO's southern flank, led to a deterioration of our relations with
Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus, and got our ambassador, Roger Davis,
killed).
One might add the CIA's intelligence failure in Saigon in April
1975, when the CIA station chief chose to believe the communist
Hungarian ambassador instead of agency intelligence sources regarding
Hanoi's final intentions for Saigon; the agency's failure to
cover the developing South African nuclear capability; and its inability
to cover the invasion of Zaire by Katangese gendarmes in March
1977. The list of CIA intelligence failures is almost endless. Representative
Pike concluded emphatically that CIA intelligence production
was lousy.
The Angola program itself was grounded in three substantial intelligence
failures. First, the "Tar Baby" report of 1969 (NSSM 39)
discounted the tenacity of the black nationalist movements. Second,
we failed to predict and prepare for the coup in Portugal. And the
options paper which the CIA presented to the 40 Committee on July
14, 1975 stated that a United States program of s40 million would
likely match any Soviet increase in aid to Neto-the Soviet Angola
program eventually exceeded $400 million.
To correct the Angolan intelligence deficit, headquarters sent endless
reminders and warnings to the field, all to no avail. By the end
of the war we had little more detailed knowledge of our allies than
we had after my trip in late August; no "book" had been made, no
lists of FNLA/UNIT A commanders, troop units, or advisors. As the
war evolved the CIA advisors reported some battles as they occurred,
but not all, and were not able to account for allied combat
losses. The field stations clamored endlessly for more arms and ammunition,
but kept no record of what weapons were issued to which
units.* Roberto and Savimbi never cooperated to the point of telling
•After the war it was learned that in some cases UNIT A had dumped some of our