In Search of Enemies - A CIA Story - John Stockwell
In Search of Enemies - A CIA Story - John Stockwell
In Search of Enemies - A CIA Story - John Stockwell
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[218] IN SF.ARCH OF ENEMIES<br />
the war: mine Luanda harbor, use United States submarines to interdict<br />
shipping, introduce American personnel, air drop firecrackers.<br />
Eve~ <strong>CIA</strong> station involved in the conflict urged <strong>of</strong>ficial cooperation<br />
with the South Africans and devised joint operations which would<br />
tempt headquarters into escalating <strong>CIA</strong> involvement with them. The<br />
Kinshasa station, especially;promoted joint South African activities,<br />
and its <strong>of</strong>ficers flew to South Africa to discuss the possibilities. The<br />
Kinshasa station urgently recommended that a U.S. Air Force C-141<br />
be provided to fly six additional twenty-five-pounder cannon with<br />
crews from South Africa to Kinshasa for use in northern Angola,<br />
stating that it was "very much in favor <strong>of</strong> retaining to the fullest<br />
extent possible South African involvement." It received a frustrated<br />
turndown from headquarters. Undaunted, Kinshasa relayed urgent<br />
South African requests for fuel, for more sophisticated weapons, air<br />
support, and trucks. Then it reported a South African plan to fly a<br />
task force into southern Zaire to attack Texeira da Sousa from the<br />
border. Kinshasa station was encouraged in its policy toward the<br />
South Africans by cables from the <strong>CIA</strong> stations in Lusaka and<br />
Pretoria.<br />
The French contributed more ammunition and four Allouette<br />
missile-firing helicopters, which U.S. Air Force C-141 airplanes<br />
hauled to Kinshasa in early January. Without pikits or ground crews<br />
they were useless, and the <strong>CIA</strong> desperately sought mercenaries who<br />
might fly them. We also negotiated with the U.S. Air Force for a<br />
C-130 to support the helicopters at the Angolan battlefronts. The<br />
<strong>CIA</strong> actually intended to deliver these helicopters and the USAF<br />
C-130 to the South Africans, despite United States policy against<br />
such military collaboration. The French were to be mere intermediaries.<br />
But time ran out, and the South Africans withdrew before<br />
pilots and crews could be located.<br />
<strong>In</strong> November, a security <strong>of</strong>ficer hand-carried a report from Kinshasa<br />
to headquarters, charging that the immoral personal conduct<br />
and the insecure operations <strong>of</strong> <strong>CIA</strong> personnel in Kinshasa were an<br />
embarassment to the United States charge d'affaires. Such a report<br />
from a security <strong>of</strong>ficer would normally carry some weight, but once<br />
again the agency's lack <strong>of</strong> an effective inspector general was exposed,<br />
as the DDO and director took no disciplinary action.<br />
The program was four months old and TDY <strong>of</strong>ficers began rotating<br />
back from the field, bringing with them anecdotes and personal<br />
accounts <strong>of</strong> the things that don't get written into <strong>of</strong>ficial cables, the