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In Search of Enemies - A CIA Story - John Stockwell

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<strong>CIA</strong> v. Congress<br />

Southeast Asia, when a prominent senator had been briefed on the<br />

<strong>CIA</strong> program in detail and even shown upcountry installations, and<br />

later publicly denied any knowledge <strong>of</strong> the program. If Clark was<br />

going to mess around our program, talking to Africans, then we<br />

damn well better see that our own agents put their best feet forward.<br />

Someone admitted that it wasn't very smart having a cable like<br />

that in the files.* Eventually we could expect the Senate to close the<br />

program down and investigate it. They just might get their hands on<br />

such a cable and kick up a fuss.<br />

Senator Clark returned from his trip skeptical <strong>of</strong> his <strong>CIA</strong> briefings<br />

and <strong>of</strong> the Angola program. He was concerned that we were secretly<br />

dragging the United States into a broad conflict with dangerous,<br />

global implications. Specifically, he was concerned (a) that we were<br />

in fact sending arms directly into Angola; (b) that Americans were<br />

involved in the conflict; and (c) that the <strong>CIA</strong> was illegally collaborating<br />

with South Africa. However, Clark could not disprove our cover<br />

story and he had few moves to make against us. He could not<br />

precipitate a public debate because he was now muzzled by the <strong>CIA</strong><br />

-in receiving the <strong>CIA</strong>'s briefing about IAFEATURE, he had given his<br />

tacit oath not to expose the information he received. The atmosphere<br />

in Congress was such that he would be highly discredited with his<br />

colleagues, jeopardizing his effectiveness on the Senate Foreign Relations<br />

Committee, if he spoke out. Dozens <strong>of</strong> other legislators were<br />

similarly entrapped, as Colby methodically continued his briefings<br />

throughout the program-thirty-five briefings altogether between<br />

January 1975 and January 1976. Systematically, he misled congressmen<br />

about what we were doing in Angola, but nevertheless deprived<br />

them <strong>of</strong> the option <strong>of</strong> going public.•• This was the flaw <strong>of</strong> the<br />

Hughes-Ryan Amendment, aside from the fact that it did not specify<br />

•Although the file on Senator Clark was "s<strong>of</strong>t,', and therefore safe from Freedom<br />

<strong>of</strong> <strong>In</strong>formation Act demands, the cable also appeared in the IAFEATURE chronological<br />

files and in the computer which records every agency cable.<br />

•*<strong>In</strong> Honorable Men, Colby claims, in a thesis that recurs throughout the book, that<br />

he worked with determination to make the <strong>CIA</strong> "an integral part <strong>of</strong> our democratic<br />

system <strong>of</strong> checks and balances among the Executive and Congress and the Judiciary,"<br />

by testifying before the congressional committees. And yet, while he was<br />

answering their questions about past <strong>CIA</strong> operations, he was feeding them patently<br />

false information about the ongoing Angolan operation, depriving them <strong>of</strong> the full<br />

information which they needed to perform their constitutional role.

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