In Search of Enemies - A CIA Story - John Stockwell
In Search of Enemies - A CIA Story - John Stockwell
In Search of Enemies - A CIA Story - John Stockwell
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<strong>CIA</strong> v. Congress<br />
Southeast Asia, when a prominent senator had been briefed on the<br />
<strong>CIA</strong> program in detail and even shown upcountry installations, and<br />
later publicly denied any knowledge <strong>of</strong> the program. If Clark was<br />
going to mess around our program, talking to Africans, then we<br />
damn well better see that our own agents put their best feet forward.<br />
Someone admitted that it wasn't very smart having a cable like<br />
that in the files.* Eventually we could expect the Senate to close the<br />
program down and investigate it. They just might get their hands on<br />
such a cable and kick up a fuss.<br />
Senator Clark returned from his trip skeptical <strong>of</strong> his <strong>CIA</strong> briefings<br />
and <strong>of</strong> the Angola program. He was concerned that we were secretly<br />
dragging the United States into a broad conflict with dangerous,<br />
global implications. Specifically, he was concerned (a) that we were<br />
in fact sending arms directly into Angola; (b) that Americans were<br />
involved in the conflict; and (c) that the <strong>CIA</strong> was illegally collaborating<br />
with South Africa. However, Clark could not disprove our cover<br />
story and he had few moves to make against us. He could not<br />
precipitate a public debate because he was now muzzled by the <strong>CIA</strong><br />
-in receiving the <strong>CIA</strong>'s briefing about IAFEATURE, he had given his<br />
tacit oath not to expose the information he received. The atmosphere<br />
in Congress was such that he would be highly discredited with his<br />
colleagues, jeopardizing his effectiveness on the Senate Foreign Relations<br />
Committee, if he spoke out. Dozens <strong>of</strong> other legislators were<br />
similarly entrapped, as Colby methodically continued his briefings<br />
throughout the program-thirty-five briefings altogether between<br />
January 1975 and January 1976. Systematically, he misled congressmen<br />
about what we were doing in Angola, but nevertheless deprived<br />
them <strong>of</strong> the option <strong>of</strong> going public.•• This was the flaw <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Hughes-Ryan Amendment, aside from the fact that it did not specify<br />
•Although the file on Senator Clark was "s<strong>of</strong>t,', and therefore safe from Freedom<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>In</strong>formation Act demands, the cable also appeared in the IAFEATURE chronological<br />
files and in the computer which records every agency cable.<br />
•*<strong>In</strong> Honorable Men, Colby claims, in a thesis that recurs throughout the book, that<br />
he worked with determination to make the <strong>CIA</strong> "an integral part <strong>of</strong> our democratic<br />
system <strong>of</strong> checks and balances among the Executive and Congress and the Judiciary,"<br />
by testifying before the congressional committees. And yet, while he was<br />
answering their questions about past <strong>CIA</strong> operations, he was feeding them patently<br />
false information about the ongoing Angolan operation, depriving them <strong>of</strong> the full<br />
information which they needed to perform their constitutional role.