In Search of Enemies - A CIA Story - John Stockwell

[204) IN SEARCH OF ENEMIES
payment of sn6 million to the Bank of Angola. The next payments
due were $100 million on December n, and s102 million on January
15, 1976. On November II, the MPLA took control of the Bank of
Angola and the dossier of contracts with Gulf and by defeating
Mobutu's November 6 invasion of Cabinda it maintained physical
control of the Cabindan oil fields.
The war created serious problems for Gulf. Not only was the flow
of oil threatened, there were also the lives of its 420 technicians to
be considered; 17 of them were Americans. In early November 1975,
because of the fighting Gulf was obliged to suspend operations and
evacuate its employees from Cabinda. The MPLA urged Gulf to
resume operations and guaranteed its technicians' safety. Gulf would
gladly have taken the MPLA deal. There was no threat of nationali·
zation, as the MPLA needed Gulfs assistance indefinitely to keep the
vital revenues coming in.
The working group was exasperated. Our total budget for IAFEA·
TURE was only s31.7 million. Within two months Gulf would yield
s200 million cash to the MPLA. CIA and State Department attor·
neys repeatedly discussed means of blocking Gulfs payments to the
MPLA, and pressure was brought to bear. The FNLA and UNITA
were jointly attempting to establish a provisional government, but
were unable to gain recognition and Gulf could not be persuaded to
deliver the money to Roberto or Savimbi unless they controlled
Cabinda. On December 23 Gulf compromised and put s125 million
in an escrow bank account.
At the same time Boeing wanted very much to consummate its
deal and deliver the two 737s to TAAG. The MPLA wanted the
planes; the money, s30 million, had already been paid. Twelve
TAAG pilots were in Seattle training to fly them. TAAG was also
planning to buy four shortened airbuses at s5 million each. Boeing
was eager to place its crews in Luanda to begin working on the radar
systems. American technicians and businessmen were still welcome
despite the war, the Cubans, and the antagonism between the United
States and the MPLA. Realists thought the war should have been
over by mid· November. The business interests were eager to bury the
hatchet and get on with commerce.
But the CIA, the working group, and Henry Kissinger were not
about to permit the delivery of new American jet airliners to Luanda.
Why provide the means for the MPLA to fly their delegations
around the world, drumming up support? In November the State