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In Search of Enemies - A CIA Story - John Stockwell

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IN SEARCH OF ENEMIES<br />

Monday, August 25, I briefed Potts at the morning staff meeting,<br />

fleshing out my cabled report about the FNLA, and describing<br />

UNIT A. Bantam told me to stand by to brief the director and the<br />

40 Committee, but Potts scotched that, relaying the gist <strong>of</strong> my<br />

findings up the ladder without taking me along. This was consistent<br />

with his tendency to keep that level <strong>of</strong> activity to himself, and I<br />

probably encouraged his caution anyway when I confronted him in<br />

his <strong>of</strong>fice immediately after the staff meeting.<br />

Potts and I had never analyzed the Angola program together.<br />

Now that I was confident <strong>of</strong> my knowledge <strong>of</strong> Angola, I wanted to<br />

have an airing, to hear his rationale for the program, and to make<br />

some basic suggestions. He had all along discouraged this kind <strong>of</strong><br />

questioning in the staff meetings and I hoped to be more successful<br />

in the privacy <strong>of</strong> his <strong>of</strong>fice.<br />

It didn't work. Potts refused to respond and the meeting became<br />

a <strong>Stockwell</strong> monologue which went something like this: We had two<br />

viable options in Angola. We could give the FNLA and UNITA<br />

enough support to win-by going in quickly with tactical air support<br />

and advisors we could take Luanda and put the MPLA out <strong>of</strong><br />

business before the Soviets could react. Otherwise, if we weren't<br />

willing to do that, we would further U.S. interests by staying out <strong>of</strong><br />

the conflict. The middle ground, feeling our way along with small<br />

amounts <strong>of</strong> aid, would only escalate the war and get the United States<br />

far out on a fragile limb. It would help neither the Angolan people<br />

nor us. To the contrary, it would jeopardize the United States' position<br />

in southern Africa.<br />

Potts wanted none <strong>of</strong> it. <strong>In</strong> his best patronizing manner he averred<br />

that I would with more experience find "these situations" difficult.<br />

Clear solutions rarely presented themselves. Our program would no<br />

doubt be a compromise between my alternatives. He broke otf the<br />

conversation. On the way into the working group session Thursday<br />

morning, August 28, however, he reinforced the point.<br />

"Just stick to the facts about your trip," he said. "Don't make any<br />

conclusions or recommendations." Possibly Potts would have been<br />

happier without me along, but that would have been awkward. The<br />

working group knew <strong>of</strong> my trip and was eager to hear the report first<br />

hand.<br />

Working group meetings were held in the DDO's spare conference<br />

room <strong>of</strong>f"C" corridor on the third floor. Paneled and carpeted, with a

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