In Search of Enemies - A CIA Story - John Stockwell
In Search of Enemies - A CIA Story - John Stockwell
In Search of Enemies - A CIA Story - John Stockwell
Create successful ePaper yourself
Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.
IN SEARCH OF ENEMIES<br />
Monday, August 25, I briefed Potts at the morning staff meeting,<br />
fleshing out my cabled report about the FNLA, and describing<br />
UNIT A. Bantam told me to stand by to brief the director and the<br />
40 Committee, but Potts scotched that, relaying the gist <strong>of</strong> my<br />
findings up the ladder without taking me along. This was consistent<br />
with his tendency to keep that level <strong>of</strong> activity to himself, and I<br />
probably encouraged his caution anyway when I confronted him in<br />
his <strong>of</strong>fice immediately after the staff meeting.<br />
Potts and I had never analyzed the Angola program together.<br />
Now that I was confident <strong>of</strong> my knowledge <strong>of</strong> Angola, I wanted to<br />
have an airing, to hear his rationale for the program, and to make<br />
some basic suggestions. He had all along discouraged this kind <strong>of</strong><br />
questioning in the staff meetings and I hoped to be more successful<br />
in the privacy <strong>of</strong> his <strong>of</strong>fice.<br />
It didn't work. Potts refused to respond and the meeting became<br />
a <strong>Stockwell</strong> monologue which went something like this: We had two<br />
viable options in Angola. We could give the FNLA and UNITA<br />
enough support to win-by going in quickly with tactical air support<br />
and advisors we could take Luanda and put the MPLA out <strong>of</strong><br />
business before the Soviets could react. Otherwise, if we weren't<br />
willing to do that, we would further U.S. interests by staying out <strong>of</strong><br />
the conflict. The middle ground, feeling our way along with small<br />
amounts <strong>of</strong> aid, would only escalate the war and get the United States<br />
far out on a fragile limb. It would help neither the Angolan people<br />
nor us. To the contrary, it would jeopardize the United States' position<br />
in southern Africa.<br />
Potts wanted none <strong>of</strong> it. <strong>In</strong> his best patronizing manner he averred<br />
that I would with more experience find "these situations" difficult.<br />
Clear solutions rarely presented themselves. Our program would no<br />
doubt be a compromise between my alternatives. He broke otf the<br />
conversation. On the way into the working group session Thursday<br />
morning, August 28, however, he reinforced the point.<br />
"Just stick to the facts about your trip," he said. "Don't make any<br />
conclusions or recommendations." Possibly Potts would have been<br />
happier without me along, but that would have been awkward. The<br />
working group knew <strong>of</strong> my trip and was eager to hear the report first<br />
hand.<br />
Working group meetings were held in the DDO's spare conference<br />
room <strong>of</strong>f"C" corridor on the third floor. Paneled and carpeted, with a