In Search of Enemies - A CIA Story - John Stockwell

(170) IN SEARC H OF ENEMIES
when the arrival of a few hundred Cuban soldiers in Angola was
being discussed. The working group was thinking of replying with
another Zairian battalion, a few dozen mercenaries, and some
Redeye missiles. So far it had been a gentleman's war, with modest
escalations and no suprises. During the summer of 1975 260 Cuban
advisors had joined the MPLA, but their presence had scarcely been
felt. Now, however, the Cuban ship, Vietnam Herioca had delivered
700 unif onned, regular army, Cuban soldiers to Porto Amboim
south of Luanda. The working group tended to view this as a worri·
some escalation, but not one which seriously disrupted the quiet
evolution of the war.
"Gentlemen," I interrupted, leaning forward, "I suggest we think
in terms of ten to fifteen thousand Cuban soldiers, a squadron of
MIGs, and a hundred or so tanks."
Silence fell while they considered the magnitude of such a force.
It could march on Kinshasa virtually unopposed. The MIGs would
have no problem strafing Mobutu's palace or knocking out the Inga
dam which supplied electricity to the entire lower Zaire area. However,
such a threat and the escalation that would be necessary to
neutralize it were too big for this group to handle, and the discussion
resumed at the level of a few mercenaries, with perhaps a dozen
ground-to-air rockets thrown in for good measure.
As the meeting broke up one participant asked me if the CIA had
any special information that large numbers of Cubans might be
brought into the conflict. Others turned their heads, listening with
interest. We didn't-it wasn't a matter of hard information, special
intelligence, or a formal warning from the analysts of the Deputy
Directorate of Information. But it was obvious nevertheless. We had
introduced the Zairian battalions and the South Africans, and our
side had momentum. But the Soviets had mounted a highly visible
program in Angola, which was already larger than ours, and their
prestige was at stake. And the Cubans had publicly stated their
intention to intervene. It was illogical to hope that they would permit
the U.S. a cheap victory. This wasn't the 1961 missile crisis in Cuba
where our president could react with great bravado and domestic
support. It was Angola, a mere five months after the fall of Vietnam.
Moreover, the Cuban policy in Angola was consistent with Cuba's
ideology and its international stance. Our Angola program, like the
previous Bay of Pigs and Operation Mongoose war against Castro,