In Search of Enemies - A CIA Story - John Stockwell

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The Economy-Size War - ' - .... . .. --- ... . ...... A variety of anns captured at Luso by the UNIT A forces, including (facing page. bottom left) several Chinese rocket-launchers, an effective weapon against light tanks and trucks. . ' -ll ·~
[168] IN SEARCH OF ENEMIES frightened MPLA force were preparing their defense and stockpiling the 122 mm. rockets, which had served them so well in September. In Washington the CIA advised the working group that the highwater mark had been reached. Without a substantial escalation of commitment, including large amounts of money for arms, tactical aircraft, antitank weapons, antiaircraft rockets, and larger numbers of advisors, the outcome would favor the MPLA. Working group members could not understand this assessment and suggested that it was a CIA ploy to get more money. After my return from Angola in late August, the headquarters Angola Task Force quickly reached full strength, with a paramilitary section, an intelligence-gathering section, a propaganda section, a reports section, and a supporting staff of secretaries and assistants. By working extra hours we were able to avoid going to twenty-fourhour shifts, but the workload was staggering and the pace frantic. For example, on September 4 alone, my notes refer to sixty-three activities of importance, things like: write a paper on Kissinger's meeting with the Zairian foreign minister; analyze a David Ottaway article in the Washington Post about American involvement in Angola; discuss UNIT A representatives in New York (funded by the CIA) who were meeting with American journalists; attend a working group meeting; attend a personnel management committee meeting; and prepare instructions for a task force officer to hand-carry to Kinshasa, things too sensitive to be put in writing in the cable traffic.* *Much CIA business is communicated to and from the field by the "back channel" -hand-carried notes, pouched single copy, official-informal letters, and verbal messages. This is consciously done to minimize the number of people inside the CIA who know of a given operation or situationt and to communicate ultrasensitive messages without leaving a written record. One example: in 1972 the CIA station in Nairobi included a black communicator who would routinely see all of the station cable traffic. That traffic included highly sensitive messages about a Nairobi/Dar-es-Salaam operation in which black Americans traveling in East Africa were surveilled by outside agents and through the Kenyan security service. It was felt by the Nairobi chief of station that the black CIA communicator could not be trusted with knowledge of this operation and his urgent replacement by a white was necessary. The COS was not about to put that in writing, however, not even in an official-informal letter. Instead, he returned to headquarters on consultations and quietly arranged for the young man's transfer.
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·As Saigon fals, the CIA destab1 1
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W.W. Norton & Company, Inc .. 500 F
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Contents Author's Note 9 Acknowledg
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Author's Note In December 1976 I ad
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Author's Note [n] by authors-Philip
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Author's Note Oth~~ad reached the s
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Author's Note th..eir public servan
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IN SEARCH OF ENEMIES cially helpful
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[20] IN SEARCH OF E N EMIES four-by
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{22] IN SEARCH OF ENt: MIES awake f
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SAUDI MAURITANIA ARABIA SCALE OF MI
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.r·· -
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. I Saigon to Washington A Braniff
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Saigon to Washington (33] struck at
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Saigon to Washington [35] It is a t
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Saigon to Washington l37] a program
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Saigon to Washington [39] quietly,
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The Angola Program "Well, disgrace
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The Angola Program (43] "We may ver
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The Angola Program (45] I kept expe
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The Angola Program [47] and country
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The Angola Program [49] later wrote
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The Angola Program Atlantic area, a
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The Angola Program [53] mit them to
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The Angola Program [55] cially, the
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3 Footsoldiers of Foreign Policy Th
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Footsoldiers of Foreign Policy Air
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Footsoldiers of Foreign Policy [61]
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Footsoldiers of Foreign Policy been
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Footsoldiers of Foreign Policy Marx
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Footsoldiers of Foreign Policy don'
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Footsoldiers of Foreign Policy [6')
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CIA People Policies tongue tip the
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CIA People Policies (73] I wanted N
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CIA People Policies find in Angola.
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CIA People Policies [77] SOG sent u
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CIA People Policies [79] Carl Banta
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CIA People Policies [81] But there
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CIA People Policies (83] but now he
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CIA People Policies [85] Potts quic
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Our Little·Known Allies FNLA insid
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Our Little-Known Allies one at CIA
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Our Little·Known Allies On Friday,
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Our Little-Known Allies [93] call t
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Our Little-Known Allies (95) was a
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Our Little-Known Allies [97] wasn't
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Our Little-Known Allies (99] boxes
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Kinshasa (IOI] ity. * Probably most
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Kinshasa ing my French. Some time l
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Kinshasa [m5] was handling some of
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Kinshasa consular officers; others
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Kinshasa St. Martin's living room w
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Kinshasa [111] reports repeatedly d
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Kinshasa [113] taining a succession
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Kinshasa (115) named after a missio
Page 116 and 117: Kinshasa of other matters to discus
Page 118 and 119: Roberto watching the forest below a
Page 120 and 121: Roberto [121] a small colonial hous
Page 122 and 123: Roberto (123] tighten. It was pitch
Page 124 and 125: Roberto [tz5] troops? In Ambriz I c
Page 126 and 127: Roberto and harassed all present, w
Page 128 and 129: Roberto that Roberto didn't know wh
Page 130 and 131: Roberto [131] Roberto intensely des
Page 132 and 133: Roberto [133]
Page 134 and 135: Roberto [ 135) if IAFEA TURE ever b
Page 136 and 137: Roberto [137] ready access to Presi
Page 138 and 139: Savimbi [139) A liberation movement
Page 140 and 141: Savimbi [141] roadside, soldiers an
Page 142 and 143: Savimbi [143] Savimbi speaking in h
Page 144 and 145: Savimbi [145] • Savimbi and a con
Page 146 and 147: Sa vim bi [147] he was expelled fro
Page 148 and 149: Sa vim bi (149] "Things did not loo
Page 150 and 151: Sa vim bi heavily on the overloaded
Page 152 and 153: Sa vim bi [153) Savimbi and General
Page 154 and 155: Savimbi "It is hard to be exact," h
Page 156 and 157: 9 The Economy-Size War My plane fro
Page 158 and 159: The Economy-Size War huge oak confe
Page 160 and 161: The Economy-Size War State Departme
Page 162 and 163: The Economy-Size War (163] thunder
Page 164 and 165: The Economy-Size War [165) 1,000 UN
Page 168 and 169: The Economy-Size War Among other me
Page 170 and 171: The Economy-Size War was a direct c
Page 172 and 173: The Economy-Size War (173] so their
Page 174 and 175: The Economy-Size War [175] out that
Page 176 and 177: Advisors, Technicians, and Foreign
Page 190 and 191: 11 Propaganda and Politics Politica
Page 192 and 193: Propaganda and Politics stormily th
Page 194 and 195: Propaganda and Politics World inter
Page 196 and 197: Propaganda and Politics [197] skysc
Page 198 and 199: Propaganda and Politics and restles
Page 200 and 201: Propaganda and Politics [201] see M
Page 202 and 203: 12 Business and Money What role doe
Page 204 and 205: Business and Money [205) Department
Page 206 and 207: Business and Money [207] The s31.7
Page 208 and 209: Business and Money [209] commercial
Page 210 and 211: Business and Money (211] ited in Eu
Page 212 and 213: 13 Disaster On November 11, 1975, t
Page 214 and 215: Disaster [215] over half that of th
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Disaster (217) was depleted, and no
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Disaster [219) human side of IAFEA
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Disaster [221] Corps Reserves and h
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Disaster [223] Number Monthly Salar
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Disaster [225] Mercenary George Cul
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14 CIA v. Congress It was back in S
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CIA v. Congress Southeast Asia, whe
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CIA "· Congress [231] The battle w
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CIA Y. Congress [233] In mid-Januar
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CIA "· Congress [235) had signed t
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CIA Y. Congress [237] headquarters
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CIA r. Congress [239] mediately put
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Disengagement blasted UNIT A out of
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Disengagement [243] while the F-27
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Disengagement (245} departures to A
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Disengagement (247] The IAMASKs wer
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Postscript I knew I should resign.
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Postscript never secret for long. I
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Postscript [253] the CIA is essenti
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I I I I . I i f I ! I ! ' ' I Appen
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Bakongo Northern Angola Holden Robe
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Appendixes (259) August 1975 Early
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Appendixes [261] APPENDIX 2: Contro
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I . Appendixes [263] APPENDIX 4: Su
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Appendixes APPENDIX 5: Total Arms a
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Appendixes APPENDIX 6: Total Arms a
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Appendixes APPENDIX 7 Adm. Stansfie
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Appendixes We were proud of the ope
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Appendixes books with a more object
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Appendixes (275) mind. That right i
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Index Africa Division, see CIA Agee
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Index [279] as .. footsoldiers of f
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Index ~. papers and presentations t
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Index Ottaway, David, 168, 194 Ovim
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Index [285] organizational chain of
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In Search of Enemies - A CIA Story - John Stockwell

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