In Search of Enemies - A CIA Story - John Stockwell

[208] IN SEARCH OF ENEMIES
Typically, CIA field commanders had an independent perspective.
They were concerned with the guns, bullets, and personalities of war,
more than with Washington's bureaucratic and political problems.
The three principals-the chiefs of the Kinshasa, Lusaka, and Pretoria
stations-were unapologetic hawks, openly determined to defeat
the "Soviet-backed" MPLA.
The CIA station in Kinshasa was the focal point of the logistical
support provided both to Mobutu and to the Angolan liberation
movements. All of our arms flights went to Kinshasa, and then
directly through the military side of Ndjili Airport and into Angola.
When the American Champion deposited its cargo in Matadi on the
lower Congo River, 144 railroad cars hauled the arms into Kinshasa.
There they were warehoused until they could be flown into Angola.
The experience was maddening because of Zairian inefficiency and
indifference. With paramilitary, logistics, and air experts cajoling,
bribing, and bullying the Zairians into getting the arms to the airport
on time, in some cases Americans driving the forklifts themselves,
the near impossible was accomplished. The American Champion
docked in Matadi on September 12, and on October 7 IAFEATURE
airplanes began lifting ten tons a day into Angola.
The Lusaka station ran intelligence-gathering teams into S~lva
Porto, coordinated with President Kaunda of Zambia and with
Savimbi, and contributed to the propaganda campaign. Pretoria
maintained close liaison with the South African government.
The weakest link in the arms fl.ow was between Kinshasa and the
Angolan bases. Initially Mobutu's C-13o's and DC-4 did the hauling,
but this involved an intolerable liability for the CIA. Mobutu's attachment
to his C-13o's was fabled, and the Zaire economy was
nearly bankrupt. If one of his C-13o's were lost in Angola, Mobutu
would demand that it be replaced, and at $10 to s15 million dollars
each, the CIA's Angola program could not underwrite such a loss.
The obvious solution of using U.S. Air Force tactical air transports
was constantly sought by the agency, but here the magic phone calls
didn't work; they inevitably reached the desk of the secretary of
defense, James Schlesinger, who steadfastly said no. Ours was a
controversial, covert, CIA program, and Schlesinger wouldn't let
traceable U.S. Air Force planes and crews enter the Angolan airspace.
From August 1975 through January 1976 we sought to lease a