In Search of Enemies - A CIA Story - John Stockwell

[216] IN SEARCH OF ENEMIES
The rout of the FNLA and Zairians at Quifangondo was a disappointment
but not a shock to the working group. By then the managers
of IAFEA TURE were realizing the scope of the Soviet/Cuban
commitment in Angola: Soviet expenditures were estimated as high
as s225 million by late November. Ours had not yet reached s25
million. The Soviets had sent seven shiploads to our one, a hundred
planeloads to our nine.* Thousands of Cuban soldiers were arriving,
and we had photographic evidence that they had the larger T-54
tanks. In a penny-ante war, the Soviets had opened their wallets and
put real money on the table.
Competitive juices stirred in Washington and the no-win rationale
was dropped at all levels. Ambassador Mulcahy flew to Kinshasa to
reassure Mobutu of our determination and full support. The National
Security Council ordered the CIA to outline a program which
could win the war. Sophisticated weapons were now discussed freely:
Redeye ground-to-air missiles, antitank missiles, heavy artillery, tactical
air support, C-47 gun platforms. The working group considered
major escalations: the formal introduction of American advisors, the
use of American army units, a show of the fleet off Luanda, and the
feasibility of making an overt military feint at Cuba itself to force
Castro to recall his troops and defend the home island.
There was a thread of unreality, of wishful thinking in these discussions.
The gap between Henry Kissinger's egotistical desire to win
and the limits of his power in the real world became apparent. In July
1975, Director Colby had warned that it would take a s100 million
program to be sure of winning. This was probably high-in August
my trip had revealed that a sophisticated weapons system, such as
a C-47 gunship costing s200,ooo, would have shattered the MPLA
forces. By December, however, because of the massive Soviet/Cuban
build-up, we would be coming from behind, even with a s100 million
effort.
On the task force we labored through several nights to produce a
new options paper which offered a choice of s30-, s6o-, or s100-
million programs. They included armor, artillery, tactical aircraft, a
C-130 aircraft, and one thousand mercenaries. But the National Security
Council was stymied. The CIA Contingency Reserve Fund
*Eventually we mounted a total of twenty-nine C-141 flights, the last one arriving
in Kinshasa January 29, 1976.