In Search of Enemies - A CIA Story - John Stockwell
In Search of Enemies - A CIA Story - John Stockwell
In Search of Enemies - A CIA Story - John Stockwell
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Disaster (217)<br />
was depleted, and no more secret funds were available. Further<br />
escalations could be financed only with congressional approval, and<br />
the Congress was not cooperative.<br />
The administration attempted unsuccessfully to "borrow" s28<br />
million from the Department <strong>of</strong> Defense budget. The <strong>CIA</strong>'s last $7<br />
million reserves were committed, to keep our effort alive while desperate<br />
measures were considered.<br />
These combined circumstances, the lack <strong>of</strong>f unds and an uncooperative<br />
Congress, may have saved our nation from a tragic escalation<br />
in Angola-another Vietnam. The s30-60-roo-million options would<br />
have plunged us in deeper, without reversing the situation. We did<br />
not have a thousand mercenaries to send to Angola, and even if we<br />
had, a thousand undiscipJined adventurers would have accomplished<br />
little against ten thousand organized Cuban regular army troops.<br />
Under great pressure to pull a magic ace out <strong>of</strong> a losing hand, the<br />
<strong>CIA</strong> decided to use part <strong>of</strong> the s7 million to recruit the twenty<br />
Frenchmen and three .hundred Portuguese mercenaries. It was a<br />
senseless gesture, but something, at least, to report to the 40 Committee.<br />
And we requested approval to place American advisors in Angola.*<br />
<strong>In</strong>credibly, Henry Kissinger, having ordered us to assure our<br />
allies <strong>of</strong> our full support, having ordered us to seek every means to<br />
escalate the Angolan conflict, could not be bothered to focus on the<br />
situation. He grunted and went to China.<br />
<strong>In</strong>side the <strong>CIA</strong>, in November and December, we buckled down<br />
and worked ever harder, as though the speed with which we answered<br />
cables and produced memos for the working group could<br />
vindicate our ineptness on the battlefield. Potts became obsessed with<br />
the program, swinging in to work on his crutches in the grey chill<br />
<strong>of</strong> the autumn predawn, his mind brimming with desperate plans for<br />
the program. His safes were finally locked hours after dark, when he<br />
would slowly make his way down the southwest steps, his face still<br />
locked in concentration. His secretary would remain another two<br />
hours at her desk, sorting, typing, and filing his paperwork. The task<br />
force kept the same pace. Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays blended<br />
into Mondays and Fridays.<br />
Case <strong>of</strong>ficers in the field responded with a comparable effort. Kinshasa<br />
continued a barage <strong>of</strong> suggestions to headquarters to escalate<br />
*See Prologue, above.