In Search of Enemies - A CIA Story - John Stockwell

[68) IN SEARCH OF ENEMIES
early March they gunned down fifty unarmed MPLA activists. The
fate of Angola was then sealed in blood. The issue could only be
decided through violence.• Again, the CIA support of the FNLA
was known in Luanda and in Kinshasa where the Soviets and Cubans
maintained active embassies.
Although allied with the MPLA through the early seventies, the
Soviets had shut off -the_ir support in 1973. Only in March 1975 did
the Soviet Union begin significant arms shipments to the MPLA.
Then, in response to the Chinese and American programs, and the
FNLA's successes, it launched a massive airlift. Its AN-12 and the
giant AN-22 airplanes carried their loads to the Republic of Congo
(Brazzaville) where short-haul air transports and small ships filtered
the weapons to MPLA units near Luanda.
The Portuguese, although officially neutral, tended to favor the
MPLA and did not inhibit their access to Soviet arms.
The fighting in Luanda intensified in July. With about equal force
of arms, the MPLA had the significant advantage of defending the
Mbundu homelands. It prevailed and evicted the FNLA and
UNIT A from Luanda.
!\1acElhinney was convinced that the CIA Angola program was
a mistake which would damage and discredit the United States. We
were confronting the Soviets over a country that was of little importance
to either of us, at a time when the United States internal politics
and public sensitivities would prevent us from following through, if
the conflict escalated. The Chinese and Soviets had each made public
announcements of their support of Angolan factions. The United
States, under Kissinger's leadership, was publicly committed to an
embargo against the delivery of arms to Angolan factions while it
was secretly launching a paramilitary program. Such a program was
self-limiting-too small to win, it was at the same time too large to
be kept secret.
Okay, okay! I said. But what then do we do in Angola? What is
our best line?
Far better would be a policy of noninvolvement. Sincerely con-
•Note that the original 40 Committee options paper acknowledged the United
States' vulnerability to charges of escalating the Angola conflict when it stated that
a leak by an American official source would be serious, that we would be charged
with responsibility for the spread of civil war in Angola.