A comparative analysis of the US and EU retail banking markets - Wsbi
A comparative analysis of the US and EU retail banking markets - Wsbi
A comparative analysis of the US and EU retail banking markets - Wsbi
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Although younger than CESR, both CEBS <strong>and</strong><br />
CEIOPS also published st<strong>and</strong>ards aimed at national<br />
supervisors, with a view to coordinating national<br />
approaches 178 .<br />
The establishment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> three “Level 3” Committees<br />
does however not mean that all previously existing<br />
forums have disappeared. Currently active forums<br />
include <strong>the</strong> Banking Supervisory Committee (BSC), a<br />
committee established by <strong>the</strong> European System <strong>of</strong><br />
Central Bank (ESCB) to assist in <strong>the</strong> ECB’s role in<br />
prudential supervision, as well as <strong>the</strong> Groupe de<br />
Contact, a forum for exchange <strong>of</strong> views <strong>and</strong><br />
practices between regulators <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> conference <strong>of</strong><br />
insurance supervisory authorities (CIS), a forum for<br />
exchange <strong>of</strong> views <strong>and</strong> practices between regulators.<br />
4.2.4.2.2 Member State level<br />
At present, <strong>the</strong> legal framework for <strong>the</strong> supervision<br />
<strong>of</strong> credit institutions (as for insurance undertakings<br />
<strong>and</strong> securities firms) is firmly grounded in one <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
core principles <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> internal market, that <strong>of</strong> home<br />
country control, which allows a financial institution<br />
based in one country to be supervised by its national<br />
competent authority. More precisely, it allows a firm<br />
to provide services in ano<strong>the</strong>r country or to open a<br />
branch in that country while being supervised by its<br />
national supervisor 179 . However, this principle does<br />
not generally apply to cross-border business performed<br />
on <strong>the</strong> basis <strong>of</strong> subsidiaries: when a firm decides to<br />
open a subsidiary in ano<strong>the</strong>r <strong>EU</strong> Member State, that<br />
subsidiary becomes subject to <strong>the</strong> control <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> host<br />
Member State.<br />
4.2.4.2.3 Cross-border supervision<br />
The fact that <strong>the</strong> principle <strong>of</strong> home country<br />
supervision does not apply to subsidiaries located in<br />
ano<strong>the</strong>r Member State has led to criticisms in recent<br />
years. Specifically, a number <strong>of</strong> internationally-active<br />
banks have argued that <strong>the</strong>y operate on <strong>the</strong> basis <strong>of</strong><br />
business lines, which are European in scope, <strong>and</strong> that<br />
this should be reflected in <strong>the</strong> organisation <strong>of</strong><br />
supervision in Europe.<br />
This led some banks to ask for <strong>the</strong> supervisory<br />
structure to be changed, for example by establishing<br />
a single <strong>EU</strong> supervisor, a two-tier system <strong>of</strong> <strong>banking</strong><br />
supervision or a system <strong>of</strong> lead supervisors 180 .<br />
With <strong>the</strong> adoption <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Capital Requirements Directive,<br />
which transposes <strong>the</strong> new Basel II International<br />
Framework into <strong>EU</strong> legislation 181 , <strong>the</strong> <strong>EU</strong> legislator<br />
has brought few but substantial changes to <strong>the</strong> <strong>EU</strong><br />
framework for <strong>the</strong> supervision <strong>of</strong> banks. As an<br />
illustration, <strong>the</strong> Directive enhances <strong>the</strong> powers<br />
granted to <strong>the</strong> “consolidating supervisor”, defined<br />
as <strong>the</strong> competent authority <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Member State<br />
where <strong>the</strong> head <strong>of</strong>fice <strong>of</strong> a group is located, in <strong>the</strong><br />
case <strong>of</strong> a credit institution with activities in different<br />
Member States. Specifically, <strong>the</strong> consolidating<br />
supervisor has <strong>the</strong> final say in some specific areas <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>banking</strong> supervision (i.e. <strong>the</strong> validation <strong>of</strong> internal<br />
models), in situations where <strong>the</strong> different authorities<br />
responsible for <strong>the</strong> supervision <strong>of</strong> a bank cannot<br />
reach agreement. This is an important provision, as<br />
for <strong>the</strong> first time <strong>the</strong> competent authority <strong>of</strong> a<br />
Member State can <strong>the</strong>oretically go against <strong>the</strong> view<br />
expressed by <strong>the</strong> competent authority responsible<br />
for <strong>the</strong> subsidiary <strong>of</strong> a <strong>banking</strong> group.<br />
The Capital Requirements Directive also clarifies <strong>the</strong><br />
mechanisms in place for Member States to cooperate,<br />
coordinate <strong>the</strong>ir actions <strong>and</strong> exchange information.<br />
In addition, certain provisions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Directive aim at<br />
increasing <strong>the</strong> convergence <strong>of</strong> supervisory practices<br />
across <strong>the</strong> European Union, such as Article 144,<br />
which forces competent authorities to disclose<br />
information. Finally, in <strong>the</strong> area <strong>of</strong> <strong>banking</strong>, <strong>the</strong><br />
creation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “Level 3” committees is widely seen<br />
as an opportunity to facilitate <strong>the</strong> supervision <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
financial industry at <strong>the</strong> European level.<br />
178 For example, CEBS published on 21 December 2004 “guidelines on prudential filters for regulatory capital”; CEIOPS published in September 2005<br />
“recommendations regarding <strong>the</strong> implications <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> IAS/IFRS – Introduction for <strong>the</strong> prudential supervision <strong>of</strong> insurance undertakings”.<br />
179 There are however exceptions to this general principle. For example, with respect to liquidity risk, <strong>the</strong> supervision <strong>of</strong> a branch is <strong>the</strong> responsibility <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
competent authority <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Member State where that branch is located.<br />
180 See for example three recent publications by <strong>the</strong> European Financial Roundtable: “EFR recommendations on regulation <strong>and</strong> supervision”, 28 Oct 2003; “EFR<br />
report 'Towards a lead supervisor for cross border financial institutions in <strong>the</strong> <strong>EU</strong>'”, 15 Jun 2004; “Third EFR report on lead supervisor concept”, 29 Jun 2005.<br />
181 The Basel II framework, published by <strong>the</strong> Basel Committee on Banking Supervision in June 2004, revises <strong>and</strong> upgrades <strong>the</strong> original Basel Accord <strong>of</strong> 1988 on<br />
minimum capital requirements for banks. The Capital Requirements Directive, adopted in <strong>the</strong> European Union to transpose <strong>the</strong> Basel II framework, was<br />
adopted in 2005 <strong>and</strong> published in <strong>the</strong> Official Journal <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> European Union in June 2006. Formally, <strong>the</strong> Capital Requirements Directive consists <strong>of</strong> two<br />
separate texts: Directives 2006/48/EC <strong>and</strong> 2006/49/EC.<br />
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