States of Emergency - Centre for Policy Alternatives

advocacy role for its own views, without damaging its impartiality.
In this context, it is undeniable that the political and diplomatic
follow‐through of the Committee’s reports be undertaken by a
different body (e.g., OHCHR; Human Rights Council).
4.2.3
Inter‐State
Communications
Articles 41 and 42 set out the rules in regard to inter‐state
communications in considerable detail, whereby States
recognising this speciLic competence of the Human Rights
Committee are able to communicate to each other regarding
concerns they have about a State’s compliance with obligations
under the Covenant. 218 If the States Parties themselves cannot
arrive, within set timelines, to a settlement on a communication at
Lirst instance, then the Committee provides its good ofLices in
order to resolve the dispute. If this too fails, then there is provision
for an ad
 hoc conciliation commission to attempt to resolve the
matter amicably.
There are several structural as well as political limitations to this
schema. Of the former, the activation of the procedure requires a
declaratory acceptance of the Committee’s competence in this
respect (not automatic upon accession to the ICCPR), and neither
the Committee nor the conciliation commission is entitled to
decide the dispute. They may only suggest non‐binding
recommendations and good ofLices.
It is very hard to imagine within the political dynamics of the
international legal system how such a framework could be useful,
218
Rehman (2002), op cit, pp.88‐89; see also P.R. Ghandhi (1998) The
Human
Rights
Committee
and
the
Right
of
Individual
Access:
Law
and
Practice
(Aldershot: Ashgate)
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