22.01.2015 Views

States of Emergency - Centre for Policy Alternatives

States of Emergency - Centre for Policy Alternatives

States of Emergency - Centre for Policy Alternatives

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

Create successful ePaper yourself

Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.

The framers <strong>of</strong> the Second Republican Constitution <strong>of</strong> 1978 clearly<br />

perceived the declaration and the conduct <strong>of</strong> government in a<br />

state <strong>of</strong> emergency to be purely political and administrative<br />

matters; primarily the prerogative or right <strong>of</strong> the executive and to<br />

the extent oversight was contemplated, they vested Parliament<br />

with that responsibility. Whether this was driven purely on<br />

considerations <strong>of</strong> executive convenience or whether it was<br />

symptomatic <strong>of</strong> an underlying tendency to authoritarianism is a<br />

moot point. 270 More palpable is the fact that those involved in the<br />

making <strong>of</strong> this particular constitutional scheme shared a political<br />

and legal philosophy that drew copiously from Dicey and Austin:<br />

in other words, imperial‐era British legal doctrines about omnicompetence,<br />

plenary power, strong government, and commandtheory<br />

positivism. This is why perhaps a recent commentator –<br />

with distinct overtones <strong>of</strong> the Diceyan conception <strong>of</strong> martial law<br />

and the common law doctrine <strong>of</strong> necessity – felt able to make the<br />

extraordinary assertion that:<br />

“The subject <strong>of</strong> public security itself has been located<br />

within the constitution in chapter XVIII. By subjecting this<br />

area to the constitution the framers <strong>of</strong> the constitution<br />

have indicated that there is a natural aversion <strong>for</strong> the use<br />

<strong>of</strong> this subject <strong>for</strong> political and personal ends. The<br />

executive power <strong>of</strong> the land is free to declare an<br />

270<br />

See Parliamentary Series No.14 <strong>of</strong> the Second National State Assembly<br />

(1978) Report
<strong>of</strong>
the
Select
Committee
<strong>of</strong>
the
National
State
Assembly
<br />

appointed
to
consider
the
revision
<strong>of</strong>
the
Constitution, 22 nd June 1978: p.<br />

141; Dissenting Report <strong>of</strong> the Members <strong>of</strong> the Sri Lanka Freedom Party: p.<br />

149; Draft Article 149 on Public Security: p.602. See also A.J. Wilson<br />

(1980) The
Gaullist
System
in
Asia:
The
Constitution
<strong>of</strong>
Sri
Lanka
<br />

(1978) (London: Macmillan): pp.54‐56; The ‘architect’ <strong>of</strong> the 1978<br />

Constitution, President J.R. Jayewardene, Lirst articulated his case <strong>for</strong> a<br />

presidential executive in December 1966, in a speech to the Ceylon<br />

Association <strong>for</strong> the Advancement <strong>of</strong> Science, cited in Wilson (1980), op<br />

cit., p.1.<br />

175

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!