States of Emergency - Centre for Policy Alternatives
States of Emergency - Centre for Policy Alternatives
States of Emergency - Centre for Policy Alternatives
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historical considerations, and they in turn shape governance and<br />
political cultures in the exercise <strong>of</strong> emergency powers. In this<br />
section, we turn to some <strong>of</strong> the political consequences <strong>of</strong><br />
emergencies which in spite <strong>of</strong>, and in some cases, because <strong>of</strong><br />
constitutional frameworks continue to pose serious challenges to<br />
liberal constitutionalist assumptions about the separation<br />
between emergency and normalcy, and commitment to the<br />
protection <strong>of</strong> human rights and the rule <strong>of</strong> law during times <strong>of</strong><br />
crisis. 160<br />
3.2.1 Constitutional Accommodation: Misuse and Abuse<br />
As we saw, the objectives <strong>of</strong> providing <strong>for</strong> emergency powers that<br />
are Llexible in the face <strong>of</strong> adversity, yet sufLiciently robust to<br />
protect human rights and the rule <strong>of</strong> law, constitute the rationale<br />
<strong>for</strong> the models <strong>of</strong> accommodation, in particular constitutional<br />
accommodation. As Gross and Ní Aoláin state, “…the argument is<br />
made that the beneLits <strong>of</strong> accommodation exceed the potential<br />
costs <strong>of</strong> invoking such models <strong>of</strong> emergency rule. The models<br />
avoid constitutional and legal rigidity in the face <strong>of</strong> crisis, allowing<br />
governments to act responsibly, within a legal framework, against<br />
threats and dangers. Operating within the conLines <strong>of</strong> a legal<br />
system also means that mechanisms <strong>of</strong> control and supervision<br />
against abuse and misuse <strong>of</strong> powers – such as judicial review and<br />
parliamentary oversight over the actions <strong>of</strong> the executive<br />
government – are available and functioning.” 161 Against these<br />
160<br />
Jackson J. also observed that, “…emergency powers tend to kindle<br />
emergencies.”, ibid, at p.650<br />
161<br />
Gross and Ní Aoláin: p.81<br />
93