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States of Emergency - Centre for Policy Alternatives

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dictator. 15 The dictator enjoyed all the plenary powers <strong>of</strong> the<br />

consuls, and had complete command <strong>of</strong> the army and strategic and<br />

tactical decisions. He was free from intercession by the tribunes,<br />

senatorial intervention and direction, and unlike all other<br />

magistrates including the consuls was not subject to the appellate<br />

authority <strong>of</strong> the centuriate assembly. He also enjoyed immunity<br />

from punishment even after the termination <strong>of</strong> the emergency. 16<br />

The key strength and enduring appeal <strong>of</strong> the Roman dictatorship<br />

lie in the limitations imposed upon it by the constitution as well as<br />

conventions. SigniLicant among these was that the appointment <strong>of</strong><br />

a dictator was allowed only in the face an exceptional and speciLic<br />

threat to the republic, and then only <strong>for</strong> a short period. The term<br />

<strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>Lice <strong>of</strong> a dictator was a non‐renewable six months, or the<br />

expiration <strong>of</strong> the term <strong>of</strong> the consul who appointed him,<br />

whichever came Lirst. 17 Both Machiavelli and Rousseau were <strong>of</strong> the<br />

view that the features <strong>of</strong> short duration, set in advance and not<br />

liable to extension, were key strengths <strong>of</strong> the model. 18<br />

Another important restriction was that a dictator was appointed<br />

to counter a speciLic military threat, <strong>of</strong> usually external origin.<br />

However, he could not initiate armed aggression <strong>of</strong> his own<br />

volition; the role <strong>of</strong> the dictator was a purely defensive one. 19<br />

15<br />

Andrew Lintott (1999) The
Constitution
<strong>of</strong>
the
Roman
Republic<br />

(Ox<strong>for</strong>d: Clarendon Press): p.111<br />

16<br />

Rossiter (1948), op cit., pp.19, 25<br />

17<br />

Gross and Ní Aoláin: pp.21‐22<br />

18<br />

Machiavelli (1996) op cit., pp.76‐77; Jean‐Jacques Rousseau (1993) The
<br />

Social
Contract
and
Discourses
(Trans. G.D.H. Cole) (New York:<br />

Everyman): p.296<br />

19<br />

Rossiter (1948), op cit., p.24<br />

37

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