States of Emergency - Centre for Policy Alternatives
States of Emergency - Centre for Policy Alternatives
States of Emergency - Centre for Policy Alternatives
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question whether executive law‐making under Section 5 <strong>of</strong> the<br />
PSO was an unconstitutional alienation <strong>of</strong> the legislative power <strong>of</strong><br />
Parliament. Based on the doctrine <strong>of</strong> delegation, however, this<br />
issue was settled that the PSO and regulations made under it were<br />
valid and that there was nothing in the PSO to suggest that<br />
Parliament had abdicated its legislative power. In Weerasinghe v. <br />
Samarasinghe (1966), Sansoni C.J., held that, “One thing is<br />
essential <strong>for</strong> the validity <strong>of</strong> a delegation <strong>of</strong> [Parliament’s] lawmaking<br />
power, and that is that it should not abandon its legal<br />
authority to which it has delegated the power. It must not<br />
trans<strong>for</strong>m the executive into a parallel legislature and abdicate its<br />
function.” 305 The two republican constitutions have expressly<br />
provided <strong>for</strong> emergency rule‐making by the executive, and<br />
there<strong>for</strong>e, the more common question to be determined by the<br />
courts in respect <strong>of</strong> impugned regulations or executive and<br />
administrative action nowadays is the question <strong>of</strong> vires. 306<br />
In regard to executive and administrative action under emergency<br />
regulations, it was held in Hirdaramani v. Ratnavale (1971) that if<br />
an order (in this case, a detention order by a Permanent Secretary<br />
made under authority <strong>of</strong> an emergency regulation) was produced<br />
and was valid on the its face, it was <strong>for</strong> the petitioner (in this case,<br />
305<br />
Weerasinghe v. Samarasinghe (1966) 68 NLR 361 at 363; see also H.M.<br />
Zafrullah (1981) Sri Lanka’s Hybrid Presidential and Parliamentary <br />
System and the Separation <strong>of</strong> Powers (Malaya UP): pp.59‐61<br />
306<br />
Articles 16 (1), 155 (1) and 168 (1) <strong>of</strong> the 1978 Constitution;<br />
Wickremabandu v. Herath (1990) 2 SLR 348. On the reasoning <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Supreme Court in Yasapala v. Wickremasinghe (1983) 1 FRD 143, Cooray<br />
has noted that the President’s power <strong>of</strong> making emergency regulations<br />
under the 1978 constitution is ‘co‐extensive’ with that <strong>of</strong> Parliament,<br />
except <strong>for</strong> the limitation as to the period during which emergency<br />
regulations are in <strong>for</strong>ce. The ‘limitation’ is that found in Article 155 (3) to<br />
the effect that emergency regulations override law made by Parliament.<br />
Cooray (1995), op cit, p.750, fn.3<br />
192