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States of Emergency - Centre for Policy Alternatives

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the Roman republic itself was sabotaged to serve unconstitutional<br />

and illegal ends, Lirst by Cornelius Sulla during his reign <strong>of</strong> terror<br />

between 83 and 79 BC, and then by Julius Caesar commencing 48<br />

BC. Both used the <strong>for</strong>ms and powers <strong>of</strong> the constitutional<br />

dictatorship while doing away with its limitations and<br />

purposes. 164<br />

In the modern era, the best‐known example <strong>of</strong> how a democratic<br />

constitution was instrumentally used to destroy democracy and<br />

the constitutional order is that <strong>of</strong> the Weimar constitution in interwar<br />

Germany, through its notorious Article 48. 165 The Weimar<br />

constitution was a liberal democratic constitution that essentially<br />

followed the Roman model <strong>of</strong> constitutional dictatorship,<br />

interpolated with the German empire’s doctrine <strong>of</strong> the state <strong>of</strong><br />

war, in respect <strong>of</strong> its emergency provisions set out in Article 48.<br />

This provision included some excessive powers <strong>for</strong> the President<br />

<strong>of</strong> the Republic, including the use <strong>of</strong> the military to en<strong>for</strong>ce public<br />

order, exercisable at his sole discretion. Article 48 also allowed the<br />

suspension <strong>of</strong> critical fundamental rights. Theoretically, there<br />

were some explicit limitations on the exercise <strong>of</strong> these powers<br />

such as the subjection <strong>of</strong> the President to impeachment<br />

proceedings, as well as other constraints implicit from the<br />

constitutional scheme. Neither the legislature nor the courts<br />

164<br />

William E. Heitland (1969) The
Roman
Republic, Vol.2 (Florida:<br />

Gaunt): para.905‐907; Max Cary & Howard H. Scullard (1975) A
History
<br />

<strong>of</strong>
Rome
down
to
the
Reign
<strong>of</strong>
Constantine (3 rd Ed.) (New York: St.<br />

Martin’s Press): p.274‐280; Herbert F. Jolowicz & Barry Nicholas (1972) A
<br />

Historical
Introduction
to
Roman
Law
(3 rd Ed.) (New York: Greenwood<br />

Press): p.56<br />

165<br />

Rossiter (1948), op cit., pp.33‐73; Hans Mommsen (1996) The
Rise
<br />

and
Fall
<strong>of</strong>
Weimar
Democracy
(Chapel Hill: North Carolina UP); Peter L.<br />

Lindseth (2004) ‘The
Paradox
<strong>of</strong>
Parliamentary
Supremacy:
Delegation,
<br />

Democracy,
and
Dictatorship
in
Germany
and
France,
1920s
–
1950s’ 113<br />

Yale
Law
Journal 1341 at p.1361‐1371<br />

95

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