States of Emergency - Centre for Policy Alternatives

so wide, that other institutional actors (such as Parliament)
recede in importance. In a context of nearly non‐existent
parliamentary scrutiny of statutory instruments, and a generally
deferential judiciary especially in respect of emergency
regulations, the possibility of executive subversion of fundamental
rights and the rule of law is never far away. 134
Finally, it should be noted that one of the Lirst casualties of a state
of emergency in federal countries and devolved polities is the
principle of regional autonomy. Emergencies open the Lloodgates
of centralisation, as for example the constitutional experience of
the United States has shown. The administrations of President
Lincoln in a state of war, 135 and President Roosevelt in a time a
severe economic crisis followed by global war, 136 left behind
precedents of centralisation and pre‐eminence of the executive
branch that have had an enduring impact on the constitutional
evolution of that country. Even the very different federal
constitutional culture and practice in Canada and Australia
134
Ibid
135
Daniel Farber (2003) Lincoln’s
Constitution:
The
Nation,
the
President,
and
the
Courts
in
a
Time
of
Crisis
(Chicago: Chicago UP)
136
Edward S. Corwin (1947) Total
War
and
the
Constitution
(New York:
Knopf): pp.35‐37
85