States of Emergency - Centre for Policy Alternatives

emergency without having to look over its shoulders to
check whether there could arise a need, in the future, to
answer in a court of law for declaring it. But thereafter the
executive power remains answerable to the Supreme
Court for the contents and for the application of the
Regulations it might promulgate under such an
Emergency. Such an arrangement clearly satisLies the
interests of the principal parties. The state and the
citizen.” 271
The central argument of this book is predicated on the belief that
such an arrangement emphatically does not
satisfy the interest of
the principal party: the citizen. The executive power of the land
must always be made to justify its measures before, during, and
after an emergency. Based on the basic distinction between
normality and the exception, reciprocal to the recognition that the
State must be given special powers to deal with an emergency is
the expectation that the operation of emergency powers is limited
in time; that there are requirements of substantive justiLication
prior to invocation of these powers; that there are effective
mechanisms for approval, oversight and accountability; and that
the substantive reach of emergency powers are constitutionally
established and regulated, especially where fundamental rights
are implicated.
This chapter describes the constitutional and statutory framework
governing states of emergency in Sri Lanka, in terms of the
institutional arrangements between the key organs of government
and the scope of the substantive powers envisaged for the
executive in dealing with crises. While the constitutional and
271
Lakshman Marasinghe (2007) The
Evolution
of
Constitutional
Governance
in
Sri
Lanka (Colombo: Vijitha Yapa): p.273
176