States of Emergency - Centre for Policy Alternatives
States of Emergency - Centre for Policy Alternatives
States of Emergency - Centre for Policy Alternatives
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mens rea requirement <strong>for</strong> any act <strong>of</strong> commission or omission,<br />
central to any conception <strong>of</strong> serious criminal liability. The Lirst<br />
proviso to Regulation 8, however, provides <strong>for</strong> exemptions to<br />
engage in approved transactions in certain circumstances such as<br />
the furtherance <strong>of</strong> peace and the termination <strong>of</strong> terrorism with the<br />
written permission <strong>of</strong> the Competent Authority appointed by the<br />
President. This will give the Competent Authority, sweeping<br />
discretionary power over the activities, inter alia, <strong>of</strong> civil society<br />
organisations including those committed to human rights, national<br />
reconciliation and also the media. Such powers will give the<br />
government excessive control over civil society organisations<br />
which is incompatible with the freedom <strong>of</strong> expression and<br />
association and other freedoms which are necessary <strong>for</strong> the<br />
independence and autonomy <strong>of</strong> such organisations.<br />
The dangers <strong>of</strong> these regulations are made worse by the fact that<br />
an appeal from the decision <strong>of</strong> one presidential appointee, the<br />
Competent Authority is to be made to an Appeals Tribunal<br />
consisting entirely <strong>of</strong> other presidential appointees, the<br />
Secretaries to the Ministries <strong>of</strong> Defence, Finance, Nation‐Building<br />
and Justice. There are two principled objections to this<br />
arrangement. The Lirst is that it is in breach <strong>of</strong> international law,<br />
which requires a right <strong>of</strong> appeal from an administrative decision to<br />
an independent judicial body. Secondly, conferring what amounts<br />
to at least quasi‐judicial powers to persons in the executive branch<br />
<strong>of</strong> government is a violation <strong>of</strong> the principle <strong>of</strong> separation <strong>of</strong><br />
powers and is an unconstitutional encroachment into the judicial<br />
sphere. Furthermore, it is fanciful to believe that a tribunal<br />
consisting <strong>of</strong> Secretaries to Ministries can function as an<br />
independent appeals body.<br />
The wide immunity clause, Regulation 18, also gives rise to<br />
serious concern. It seeks to provide immunity from suit to public<br />
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