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States of Emergency - Centre for Policy Alternatives

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may override ordinary statutes. As Gross and Ní Aoláin note, “…in<br />

order to prevent repetition <strong>of</strong> the mistakes that led to the<br />

destruction <strong>of</strong> the Weimar constitutional experiment…modern<br />

constitutional provisions <strong>of</strong>ten proscribe any change or<br />

modiLication <strong>of</strong> the constitution itself during an emergency, or at<br />

least any change to, or modiLication <strong>of</strong>, the nature <strong>of</strong> the regime<br />

and its core constitutional norms.” 121<br />

Nonetheless, two prominent examples <strong>of</strong> liberal democratic<br />

constitutions permitting fairly broad suspension <strong>of</strong> constitutional<br />

provisions during times <strong>of</strong> emergency are those <strong>of</strong> the Swiss<br />

confederation and the Irish Republic. Under the doctrine <strong>of</strong> régime
<br />

des
pleins
 pouvoirs (regime <strong>of</strong> plenary powers), the Swiss federal<br />

government can act to safeguard the confederation’s security,<br />

independence, neutrality or economic interests in emergencies,<br />

when the legislature cannot meet or the legislative process can no<br />

longer function. While such an extreme assumption <strong>of</strong> power by<br />

the federal government would be deemed unconstitutional<br />

normally, in the circumstances it becomes operational, the<br />

doctrine <strong>of</strong>fers practically no limits, apart from Switzerland’s<br />

obligations under the European Convention <strong>of</strong> Human Rights, on<br />

the power <strong>of</strong> the federal executive.<br />

Likewise, the constitution <strong>of</strong> the Irish Republic contains a bizarre<br />

provision, Article 28.3.3°, which suspends the constitution<br />

including fundamental rights in times <strong>of</strong> emergency through the<br />

121<br />

For e.g. Article 89 (4) <strong>of</strong> the French Constitution; Articles 187, 196 <strong>of</strong><br />

the Belgian Constitution; see Gross and Ní Aoláin: p.60‐61. Under Article<br />

155 <strong>of</strong> the Sri Lankan constitution, the President is empowered to make<br />

emergency regulations which can override the provisions <strong>of</strong> any ordinary<br />

law, but not the provisions <strong>of</strong> the constitution. This is salutary. But in<br />

practice, rule by emergency powers have become so endemic, and<br />

executive accountability so weak, that emergency rule‐making <strong>of</strong>ten<br />

strays into the sphere <strong>of</strong> the unconstitutional: see Chapter 5, infra<br />

80

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