States of Emergency - Centre for Policy Alternatives

is the principal oversight mechanism in the emergency
framework, having in addition the power under Section 5 (3) of
the PSO to add, alter or revoke any emergency regulation, it may
be expected that the monthly emergency debate would be an
important one, involving opposition and backbench scrutiny of the
government and rigorous ofLicial justiLication of emergency
measures. In practice, however, this is not the case, due perhaps in
equal measure to legislative apathy and, in the context of
communal alienation and conLlict, the fear of antagonising public
opinion. There is also no report of Parliament exercising the
power to amend or revoke emergency regulations, which is a
testament to both the weakness of Parliament’s committee system
and the quality of parliamentarians.
As noted earlier, before their repeal by the Tenth Amendment to
the Constitution in 1986, the original paragraphs (8) and (9) of
Article 155 provided that where a state of emergency has been in
operation for a period of ninety consecutive days, or ninety days in
aggregate within a period of six months, a resolution passed by a
majority of two‐thirds of members was required for a valid
parliamentary approval of the continuing state of emergency. This
safeguard is no longer available.
The Sri Lankan framework is consistent with international
standards in requiring extensions to be formally made by the
executive, subject to parliamentary approval; and further, in
empowering Parliament to reject any extension and to amend or
revoke emergency regulations. However, the original framework
prior to the Tenth Amendment requiring special majorities and
limitations on the number of extensions within a stipulated period
would have been more consistent international best practice.
Section 37 (2) (b) of the South African reLlects this important
safeguard, whereby any further extension after one initial
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